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Conclusion
In the Scientific Revolution during the Age of Enlightenment, scientists and
natural philosophers sought to understand the world by categorizing it. Specimens of
rocks, plant life, and animal life were collected and sorted into groups based on perceived
similarities and differences. For example, animals were cataloged as vertebrates or
invertebrates based on whether they had backbones. Ultimately, each living organism
was categorized into a kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, and, finally, species.
This process of categorizing the natural world represented a milestone in man’s
intellectual development. However, the limitations of this period of scientific progress
became apparent as over time it became clear that some categories made little sense,
some individual classification decisions were inaccurate, and some species – notably the
duck-billed platypus – defied classification altogether.4 As a result, the classification
schemes had to adapt both as new species were discovered and as old categories proved
to be ill-conceived.5

4

HARRIET RITVO, THE PLATYPUS AND THE MERMAID AND O THER FIGMENTS OF THE CLASSIFYING
IMAGINATION 3- 12 (1997).
5
Id. at 11-17; id at 26 (“Whether or not they appreciated Linneaus’s work, it became increasingly clear to
eighteenth-century British naturalists – as , indeed, it had been clear to Linneaus himself – that his system
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The classification schemes pursued during the Enlightenment and the lessons
learned during these early attempts at categorization are surprisingly similar to the
evolution of the common law of antitrust. But there is an important difference: in law,
categories have real consequences. Calling a platypus as a mammal doesn’t change the
fact that it lays eggs.6 But calling a particular competitive practice by one name or
another often has dramatic consequences for whether or not the law permits it. In this
article, we suggest that the Enlightenment enthusiasm for taxonomy has run amok in
antitrust law, with pernicious consequences.
*****************
Legal doctrines vary in the extent to which they apply either detailed, categorical
rules or broad, open-ended standards that allow for case-specific adjudication. We can
put legal rules on a spectrum from rules to standards. Think of the tax code as the
paradigm example of specified rules, and of the common law development of doctrines
such as negligence as the paradigm example of case-specific standards. Other laws fall
somewhere in between: the securities laws and the patent laws mix specific rules
governing some aspects of doctrine with broader standards such as Rule 10b5 in
securities fraud or the doctrine of obviousness in patent law.

was artificial, in the sense that it tended to group animals on the basis of single characteristics, such as
‘dentition or the form of feet,’ often selected largely for classificatory convenience.”).
6
At least one major scientist of that early era did, in fact, assert that platypuses could not lay eggs, in order
to defend his own taxonomy of Australian mammals. Id. at 14 (“In order to defend his position, Owen had
to deny that the platypus laid eggs, a denial that implicitly identified another way in which the taxonomy of
Australian mammals had become a representative arena for contests between rival authorities.”). Many
other observers confidentally declared that the egg-laying platypus was a hoax. Id. at 15 (“Several years
later, while describing a stuffed platypus on display at the Australian pavilion of the Colonial and Indian
Exhibition, the Illustrated London News smugly reported that ‘fables were formerly told of this queer
creature, as that it laid eggs.’”).
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Antitrust law is generally thought of as inhabiting the standards end of this
spectrum.7 The basic enabling statutes offer only vague proscriptions against
“monopolization” or “contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade.”8
Antitrust’s rule of reason in particular gives courts the power and responsibility to weigh
the costs and benefits of a particular defendant’s conduct. And numerous courts and
scholars identify (and often lament) the uncertain, open-ended nature of the basic rule of
reason inquiry.9
In fact, however, despite the generality of the enabling statutes antitrust law is rife
with categorical distinctions. In Part I, we explore not only the well-known distinction
between conduct that is per se illegal and conduct judged under the rule of reason, but
also a number of categorical distinctions the courts draw, either to help delineate the
scope of the per se rule or to create distinctions within the scope of the rule of reason
itself. By and large these rules don’t come from the antitrust statutes. They are created by
courts, who are in effect converting case-specific standards en masse into categorical
rules.
In Part II, we identify a number of problems with these distinctions. One problem
is administrative: courts spend a great deal of time trying to parse conduct in order to put
it on one side or another of the lines they have created. Indeed, in many cases courts
spend more time on categorization than they do on actual economic analysis of the case
itself. Second, judicial antitrust categories are subject to manipulation. Parties go to great
lengths to fit into a box that will give them more favorable treatment, sometimes by legal
7

See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 49 (2007).
8
15 U.S.C. §§1,2.
9
See, e.g., Crane, supra note __; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev.
1 (1984).
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argument, sometimes by restructuring a transaction, and sometimes by concealing or
misrepresenting the facts of that transaction. Third, a number of the categories the courts
have created make no sense, whether because they have lost their meaning over time,
because their boundaries have eroded, because they actually tell us very little of relevance
to the competitive effects of the transaction, or because they are simply dumb. The net
result is a mess. Categories have become conclusions, displacing the fact-specific
economic analysis in which antitrust law is supposed to be engaging.
In Part III, we argue that there is a better way. We evaluate the costs and benefits
of the judicial creation of categories, and contend that the complex of antitrust boxes the
courts have created today does more harm than good. We don’t mean to suggest there is
no value to categories, and that everything must be thrown into a pure cost-benefit
analysis. Some rules (the per se rule against price fixing, for instance) make sense.
Rather, the important thing is to make sure that the categories we use have empirical
support, and that they are communicating valuable information to courts about the
competitive effects of a general practice. We think the courts have gone too far in the
creation of rules in a variety of cases. Finally, we suggest that courts make more use than
they do of certain tools – the doctrine of direct economic effect and empirical evidence –
as powerful filters for distinguishing good from bad antitrust claims.

I. The Role of Categorization in Antitrust Analysis.
Section one of the Sherman Act is notoriously vague. The statute provides, in
relevant part, that “[e]very contract … in restraint of trade … is declared to be illegal.”10
Read literally, the sweep of the language outlaws contracting entirely, as every contract
10

15 U.S.C. § 1.
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restrains trade in some way.11 Resort to legislative history does little to inform our
interpretation, as it demonstrates only that Congress intended the courts to translate
section one’s overreaching wording into a workable legal doctrine. Naturally unwilling
to interpret section one as broadly as written, the Supreme Court reasoned that section
one condemns only unreasonable restraints of trade.12 The task for antitrust courts then
became how to determine whether a particular agreement was, in fact, unreasonable.
Courts have approached this overarching reasonableness determination through a
process of categorization. There are two primary forms of categorical analysis in
antitrust jurisprudence. First, the Sherman Act itself distinguishes between unilateral and
concerted conduct, treating the former under section 2 of the Sherman Act and the latter
under section 1. Second, the Supreme Court categorized challenged restraints as being
subject to under either per se illegality or analyzed under the ‘rule of reason.’ Beyond
these two basic distinctions, courts characterize individual restraints along a series of
categorical vectors, in large measure to determine which mode of analysis to apply.13

A. Modes of Antitrust Analysis.

11

See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007) (“§ 1 could be
interpreted to proscribe all contracts”) (citations omitted).
12
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
13
Dan Crane argues that antitrust is moving from rules towards standards. Crane, supra note __.
While this is true in some respects, as the courts have cabined or eliminated per se rules, in many
cases this weakening of per se rules has taken the form not of replacing per se rules with
standards, but of building categories to divide per se from rule of reason analysis. We discuss
several examples in the sections that follow.
Our examples are concentrated in section 1 of the Sherman Act, though we also venture
into section 2. For an argument along similar lines confined to section 2 monopolization cases,
see Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253, 253 (2003)
(“Monopolization doctrine currently uses vacuous standards and conclusory labels that provide
no meaningful guidance about which conduct will be condemned as exclusionary.”).
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Federal courts have developed three modes of analysis for determining whether a
particular agreement unreasonably restrains trade.

1. The Per Se Rule
The per se rule provides the most direct mechanism for a plaintiff to establish that
a challenged restraint of trade is unreasonable. The Supreme Court has explained that
“there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use.”14 Such agreements are per se illegal.
If a contract or conspiracy falls within the ambit of the per se rule, the plaintiff need not
prove anticompetitive intent or effect. Nor will the defendant’s purported noble motives
save the agreement from condemnation.15 The per se rule “allows a court to presume that
certain limited classes of conduct have an anticompetitive effect without engaging in the
type of involved, market-specific analysis ordinarily necessary to reach such a
conclusion.”16

14

Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S.
128, 133 (1998) (some agreements are per se illegal because they “will so often prove so harmful
to competition and so rarely prove justified that the antitrust laws do not require proof that an
agreement of that kind is, in fact, anticompetitive in the particular circumstances”); see also
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 486-87 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Per se rules of antitrust illegality are reserved for those situations where logic and
experience show that the risk of injury to competition from the defendant’s behavior is so
pronounced that it is needless and wasteful to conduct the usual judicial inquiry into the balance
between the behavior’s procompetitive benefits and its anticompetitive costs.”).
15
Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 541 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing United
States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253
(1963))
16
Pace Elecs., Inc. v. Canon Computer Sys., Inc., 213 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2000).
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The per se rule represents a categorical approach for concluding that a challenged
restraint is unreasonable. Since the inception of the per se rule, the Supreme Court has
consistently acknowledged that the per se rule applies to “[c]ertain categories of
agreements17 and “permits categorical judgments.”18 In its most recent section one
opinion, 2007’s Leegin decision, the Court notes that the “per se rule [] treat[s] categories
of restraints as necessarily illegal.”19 Indeed, since the point of the per se rule is to avoid
a detailed, case-by-case inquiry into the benefits and harms of particular conduct, it
would make little sense to have a per se rule that wasn’t categorical. A practice should
not be considered illegal per se if courts have to evaluate it on the merits to decide
whether it qualifies for the per se rule in the first place.

2. Rule of Reason Analysis
Generally speaking, agreements that do not fall in a per se category are evaluated
under the rule of reason. The vast majority of trade restraint categories receive rule of

17

Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (“Certain
categories of agreements, however, have been held to be per se illegal, dispensing with the need
for case-by-case evaluation.”) (emphasis added).
18
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289
(1985) (“This per se approach permits categorical judgments with respect to certain business
practices that have proved to be predominantly anticompetitive.”) (emphasis added); ; see also
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (referring to “the category
of per se violations of the Sherman Act”) (emphasis added); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1,
(2006) (“the pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture do not fall within the narrow category
of activity that is per se unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act”) (emphasis added).
For example, the Court has opined that “[p]rice-fixing agreements between two or more
competitors, otherwise known as horizontal price-fixing agreements, fall into the category of
arrangements that are per se unlawful.” Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, (2006) (emphasis
added); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979)
(“And agreements among competitors to fix prices on their individual goods or services are
among those concerted activities that the Court has held to be within the per se category.”)
(emphasis added).
19
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007).

8

Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Lemley/Leslie

DRAFT

reason treatment.20 In contrast to the per se rule, which eschews in-depth investigation,
in rule of reason cases “the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in
deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable
restraint on competition.”21 Under the rule of reason, courts take “into account a variety
of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”22
While the inquiry is searching and often wide-ranging, it remains “focuse[d] directly on
the challenged restraint’s impact on competitive conditions. . . . [T]he rule of reason does
not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable.”23

3. “Quick Look” and the Abbreviated Rule of Reason.
The basic division of antitrust jurisprudence into the per se and rule of reason
categories naturally raises the question of how to decide what conduct is in each box.
Parties change behavior and characterizations in order to move conduct into one box or
the other; we discuss a number of ways in which they do so in the next section. But there
is also a problem we might think of as “meta-characterization”: how does a court decide
whether conduct whose legal status is disputed fits into the per se box or the rule of
reason box? Logically, courts should think about the economic effects of the conduct in
order to make the characterization decision. But to ask that question is necessarily to put

20

See Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, (1977) (noting that the rule of reason
is “applied for the majority of anticompetitive practices challenged under section 1 of the Act.”);
see also Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007); State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
21
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
22
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
23
National Soc’y of Professional Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688, 696 (1978).
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the conduct into the rule of reason box, since if the conduct was illegal per se we
wouldn’t inquire into the balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects.
To avoid this conundrum, courts have developed a form of abbreviated or “quick
look” rule of reason in an effort to characterize disputed conduct.24 The quick look
approach allows a court to make a decision about whether a new form of conduct that
appears to be facially anticompetitive should be illegal per se by asking the defendant to
demonstrate any procompetitive justifications for the conduct. If the defendant can offer
plausible economic reasons that the conduct is procompetitive, the court will put it in the
rule of reason box and compare those justifications to the competitive harms. If they
can’t, the conduct is illegal per se.
Properly understood in this way, the quick look is an evidentiary rule that allows
courts to make categorization decisions without a full-blown economic analysis that
would eliminate the benefits of the per se rule. In fact, however, some courts have started
to ossify “quick look” into an intermediate category of its own – a sort of abbreviated rule
of reason. This seems the only explanation for the Court’s decision in California Dental,
for instance.25 There, the court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s abbreviated inquiry into a
price-fixing agreement among dentists, holding that a full rule of reason analysis was
required.26 The entire debate makes no sense if “quick look” is, as originally intended, a
way of deciding whether to put conduct into the per se or rule of reason boxes. Instead,
the Court seems to have treated “quick look” as a box in and of itself. Indeed, the
Supreme Court in its most recent foray into the issue referred to quick look in passing as

24
25
26

See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
Id. at 784-87.
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a third category of analysis.27 The result is that we end up not with two categories, but
three: the per se rule, the rule of reason, and a middle category that is not quite per se
illegality, but rather an option the defendant can convert to a rule of reason approach if
they can make a certain showing.

4. Categories or Continuum?
Some antitrust commentators depict the relationship between per se and rule of
reason analysis as “less a dichotomy than a continuum.”28 The Court has provided much
ammunition for this position.29 The Court has gone so far as to assert that “properly
understood, rule-of-reason analysis is not distinct from ‘per se’ analysis. On the contrary,
agreements that are illegal per se are merely a species within the broad category of
agreements that unreasonably restrain trade; less proof is required to establish their
illegality, but they nonetheless violate the basic rule of reason.”30 Such statements show
a fundamental misunderstanding of basic antitrust principles. The per se rule and rule of
reason analysis both attempt to define those agreements that fall in the category
27

See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S.Ct. 1276, 1279 (2006). Hovenkamp refers to the quick look
approach as “an intermediate form of inquiry,” rather than a procedure for deciding which of the
two traditional forms of inquiry to apply. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 265 (3d ed. 2005).
28
ABA RULE OF REASON MONOGRAPH, supra note xx at 10 (“Once we see that the rule of reason
can sometimes be quickly applied . . . without refined fact-finding, it becomes apparent that
reasonableness inquiries are not so totally different from the per se approach ... [and] that the two
are less a dichotomy than a continuum.”) (quoting 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 3, ¶ 1508b, at 408);
Cavanagh, supra note __ at 826.
29
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (the methods are “best
viewed as a continuum, on which the `amount and range of information needed’ to evaluate a
restraint varies depending on how `highly suspicious’ and how `unique’ the restraint is.”); see
also ABA RULE OF REASON MONOGRAPH, supra note xx at 9 (“Antitrust scholars and the more
recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that, rather than being a dichotomy, the traditional per se
standard and comprehensive rule of reason analysis are more accurately viewed as representing
opposite ends of a single continuum of antitrust analysis measuring the reasonableness of the
challenged conduct.”).
30
U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 476 (1978).
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“unreasonable.” But each approach takes a different tack. The per se rule is purely
categorical: if a restraint falls in a per se class of contracts, the agreement is condemned
outright. As Timothy Muris observed before the Court decided California Dental, the
Supreme Court created a dichotomy where “per se rules are not part of the rule of reason
analysis, and have no relationship to the reasonableness of a practice.”31 Indeed, if “ruleof-reason analysis [were] not distinct from ‘per se’ analysis,” as the Court asserts,
hundreds of litigants would not be debating and dozens of federal judges would not be
publicly agonizing over which mode of analysis to apply in each antitrust case.
The development of quick look analysis muddles the strict dichotomous
categories of per se and rule of reason analysis. In California Dental, the first case in
which the Court explicitly recognizes the existence of quick look analysis, the Justices
attempt to bolster the commentators’ suggestion that antitrust employs a continuum by
way of the breathy confessional: “The truth is that our categories of analysis of
anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of
reason’ tend to make them appear.”32 Such language reinforces the notion that a
continuum is in operation.33 After California Dental, the D.C. Circuit opined that the
Supreme Court had “backed away from any reliance upon fixed categories and toward a
continuum.”34

31

Timothy Muris, In Defense of Massachusetts Board, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 (1998).
California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999).
33
See HOVENKAMP (“ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE”), supra note __ at 117 (“In its California Dental
Association (CDA) decision the Supreme Court observed that there is no bright line between per
se and rule of reason analysis, but rather a continuum.”).
32

34

Polygram Holding, Inc. v. F.T.C., 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“It would be somewhat misleading,
however, to say the “quick look” is just a new category of analysis intermediate in complexity between “
per se ” condemnation and full-blown “rule of reason” treatment, for that would suggest the Court has
moved from a dichotomy to a trichotomy, when in fact it has backed away from any reliance upon fixed
categories and toward a continuum.”).
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The Court’s attempt to recharacterize its decades-old approach to antitrust
analysis should not be understood as an abandonment of categorical decision-making, for
several reasons. First, the continuum explanation is entirely inconsistent with the Court’s
earlier pronouncements, which it has declined to distinguish or disavow. Before
acknowledging in 1999 the presence of the quick look method to prove unreasonability,
the Court described its approach as utilizing “two complementary categories of antitrust
analysis. In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so
plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their
illegality-they are ‘illegal per se.’ In the second category are agreements whose
competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business,
the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed [i.e., rule of reason
analysis].”35
There is no reasonable way to read this statement except as indicating that there
are two distinct categories of antitrust analysis in section one cases: per se and rule of
reason. When the Court muddled the categorical analysis in NCAA and Indiana
Federation of Dentists, lower courts rationalized the Court’s moves by divining the
abbreviated rule of reason, or “quick look.” But even after apparently blurring the
distinction between per se and rule of reason, the Supreme Court subsequently steadfastly
protected the per se categorical approach in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers36 and
Palmer v. B.R.G. of Georgia.37 Interpreting the Court’s quick look trajectory, the Federal
Trade Commission reasoned that “[a]lthough there have been some oblique suggestions

35

Professional Engineers, 435 U.S., at 692; see also F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (quoting National Society of Professional Engineers).
36
493 U.S. 411 (1990).
37
498 U.S. 46 (1990).
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in Supreme Court cases that perhaps the categories had merged, the Court later returned
to distinguishing between per se and rule of reason categories … [T]hese separate
categories continue to serve valid enforcement purposes and, in any event, authoritative
Supreme Court decisions continue to recognize the distinction.”38 In short, even after
disclaiming categorical analysis in favor of a flexible continuum, the Court itself
continued to employ its per se-rule of reason structure in other cases.39
Perhaps this explains why so many lower courts continue to treat these as
categories of per se and rule of reason analysis as dichotomous. Although some lower
courts have suggested that the development of quick look analysis illustrates the move
away from categories toward continua,40 even after recognition of the quick look, many
courts continue to speak as though there are only two categories of antitrust analysis: per
se and rule of reason.41 This is not surprising given that quick look is essentially a variant
of rule of reason analysis, albeit abbreviated or truncated rule of reason.

B. Characterizing restraints.
Whether an agreement falls within a per se category – and the level of scrutiny
that it will receive under whatever form of rule of reason the court applies – will be a
function of a series of other categorizations. Not surprisingly, parties fight vigorously to

38

Matter of California Dental Association, 121 F.T.C. 190, 299 (1996).
See also Barry J. Brett & Nancy C. Wallace, Sylvania and the Dual Distribution Dilemma, 26
N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 972, 973 (1981) (“Justice Powell in Sylvania made a point of preserving
both the per se rule of United States v. Topco Associates for horizontal restraints, as well as per
se rules for vertical price restraints.”).
40
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
41
See, e.g., Flash Elec., Inc. v. Universal Music & Video Dist. Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 379, 385
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Courts analyze the legality of such agreements using one of two frameworks:
either the per se approach, or the “rule of reason.”“) (citations omitted).
39
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have their conduct (or their adversary’s conduct) classed on one side or the other of the
following lines.

1. Horizontal versus Vertical
Antitrust law draws a fundamental distinction between so-called horizontal and
vertical agreements. Horizontal agreements are contracts or conspiracies among
competitors, firms at the same level in the distribution chain who we would expect to
compete against each other in a free market. Vertical restraints are “those imposed by
agreement between firms at different levels of distribution.”42
Determining whether the defendants in a section one case are in a horizontal or
vertical relationship can be dispositive, because horizontal agreements are much more
likely to be condemned as per se illegal while analogous vertical restraints are evaluated
under the rule of reason. First, with respect to price restraints, horizontal agreements to
fix or stabilize prices have been per se illegal for decades. 43 By contrast, antitrust’s
treatment of vertical price restraints has evolved. The Supreme Court initially
condemned vertical price-fixing as per se illegal in 1911 in Dr. Miles. This made
agreements by a manufacturer to set the resale price of its products illegal as a matter of
law. The Court pared back Dr. Miles’ per se rule in 1997’s State Oil v. Khan, holding
that vertical agreements to set a maximum resale price should be evaluated under the rule
of reason.44 Then, in its most recent antitrust opinion, Leegin, the Court reversed Dr.

42

Sharp Electronics, 485 U.S. at 730.
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940); U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
44
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
43
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Miles outright, rendering all vertical price agreements subject to rule of reason analysis.45
As a result, horizontal price restraints fall in the per se category and vertical ones do not.
Second, the legality of territorial restraints is a function of whether courts
conceive the agreement to be horizontal or vertical in nature. Territorial restraints exist
when sellers are assigned exclusive territories in which competition has been limited in
some form. Horizontal market division, in which competitors allocate exclusive
geographic markets to each other, is per se illegal.46 Following 1967’s Schwinn opinion,
vertical territorial restraints were also condemned as illegal per se.47 But a decade later,
the Court reversed course in Sylvania,48 holding that territorial restrictions imposed
vertically are evaluated under the rule of reason. As the Court explicitly reaffirmed the
per se rule against similar horizontal restraints,49 Sylvania marked a turning point in
section one jurisprudence and increased the stakes of the horizontal-vertical
categorization considerably.
Third, courts often characterize concerted refusals to deal as either horizontal or
vertical in nature in order to determine whether the group boycott warrants per se
condemnation. Those boycotts that “originate among the horizontal competitors” are

45

Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007).
Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (horizontal agreement to divide
geographic markets was “unlawful on its face”); U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596
(1972).
47
U. S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
48
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
49
433 U.S. at 58 n.28; see also Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); David E.
Weisberg, Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania: Implications for Horizontal, as Well as Vertical,
Restraints on Distributors, 33 BUS. LAWYER 1757, 1761 (1978) (“Thus, the Court takes pains to
contrast the vertical nature of the restraints in Continental TV with the horizontal restraints in
Topco.”).
46
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more likely to be treated as per se illegal.50 In contrast, concerted refusals to deal deemed
to be vertical receive full rule of reason analysis.51
Finally, the distinction between horizontal and vertical restraints sometimes drives
policy proposals in antitrust. For example, in the debate over the role of contribution in
antitrust claims, some scholars argued that the availability of contribution should be a
function of whether the challenged restraints was horizontal or vertical.52

2. Naked versus Ancillary
Another distinction that courts sometimes employ in determining whether a
challenged agreement goes in a per se category is whether the restraint is ancillary or
naked. Federal courts have reasoned that they “must distinguish between ‘naked’
restraints, those in which the restriction on competition is unaccompanied by new
production or products, and ‘ancillary’ restraints, those that are part of a larger endeavor
whose success they promote.”53 Naked restraints are essentially per se illegal.54
Ancillary restraints are evaluated under the rule of reason and generally survive it.55

50

See Flash Elec., Inc. v. Universal Music & Video Dist. Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 379, 388 n.4
(E.D.N.Y. 2004).
51
See infra notes __ to __ and accompanying text (discussing the horizontal versus vertical
debate in group boycott cases).
52
Donald J. Polden & E. Thomas Sullivan, Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust
Litigation: A Legislative Analysis, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 397, 416 (1983) (“Moreover, vertical
and horizontal arrangements should be distinguished, as they are in large part in standards of
antitrust liability, because beneficial effects often accompany vertical nonprice restrictions, and
the harshness of the no-contribution rule may unnecessarily inhibit otherwise procompetitive
conduct.”).
53
Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188-89 (7th Cir. 1985)).
54
See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAM NO. 23, THE RULE OF REASON (1999) (“In the
case of certain agreements, principally those directly affecting price or output, the adverse effect
on competition is readily apparent. These agreements are variously termed ‘naked restraints,’
facially anticompetitive’ or ‘inherently suspect.’”).
55
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAM NO. 23, THE RULE OF REASON, 124 (1999)
(“Ancillary restraints are judged under the rule of reason and are lawful if reasonably necessary
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Some courts have suggested that “naked restrictions” that do “not clearly fit within a per
se category” should receive quick look scrutiny,56 though it is unclear whether that quick
look will lead to per se classification or to treatment as an intermediate third category.
Regardless, for a restraint to be categorized as “naked” is a fair harbinger of impending
condemnation.

3. Voluntary Versus Coerced Restraints
In some circumstances courts classify the legality of conduct on the basis of
whether an agreement was made voluntarily or was coerced by a firm with market power.
An example is the antitrust (and patent misuse) treatment of package licenses: agreements
to purchase not just a single patent license but to license a block of patents together in a
single package. In 1950, the Supreme Court held that the package licensing of hundreds
of patents relating to radio technology was lawful, because licensees wanted the package
so they could clear all the rights they needed to manufacture their products.57 By 1969,
however, the Court held the same package license by the same patent holding company

to achieve the success of a legitimate joint venture.”)(citations omitted); see also Polk Bros., Inc.
v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 190 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The reason for distinguishing
between ‘ancillary’ and ‘naked’ restraints is to determine whether the agreement is part of a
cooperative venture with prospects for increasing output. If it is, it should not be condemned per
se.”); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(“To be ancillary, and hence exempt from the per se rule, an agreement must be subordinate and
collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction. The ancillary restraint is subordinate and collateral
in the sense that it serves to make the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its
purpose.”). See also SCFC, 36 F.3d at 970 (quoting Rothery); Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189 (‘A
restraint is ancillary when it may contribute to the success of a cooperative venture that promises
greater productivity and output.’).
56
See Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 514 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1999).
57
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Res., Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
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per se illegal because the defendants complained that they were forced to take licenses to
patents they did not want or need.58
The Federal Circuit adopted this distinction between voluntary and coerced
package licenses in Engel v. Lockformer.59 In Engel, the accused infringer had signed a
licensing agreement with the patentee for use of the patented system for connecting sheet
metal ducts together. The agreement called for calculation of royalties based in part on
the number of “corner connectors” used by the licensee; these components were not
covered by the patent. The court pointed out that this was a convenient way to calculate
royalties, and noted that the licensee “voluntarily agreed to the royalties provisions,” and
that the licensor had not “used its market power to shoehorn [the licensee] into license
agreement that forced [it] to purchase unpatented items . . .”60 As a result, it found no
coercion and hence no misuse. Had the licensee been coerced, however, the court
suggested that the royalty provision might have been invalid.61
While in theory such a distinction might make sense, as a “tie” results only from a
coercive connection,62 in practice it is likely to prove difficult if not impossible to
distinguish voluntary from involuntary agreements. Contract law has rightly shied away
from inquiring into whether one party “wanted to” agree to a contractual provision in all
but the most egregious cases. It is enough to show that they did agree. The Court’s
distinction will likely encourage self-serving testimony by both parties long after the fact
58

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Res., Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
96 F.3d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
60
96 F.3d at 1408.
61
Accord American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959) (“The
protection, or monopoly, which is given to the first patent stops where the monopoly of the
second begins. Whatever may be the asserted reason or justification of the patent owner, if he
compels a licensee to accept a package of patents or none at all, he employs one patent as a lever
to compel the acceptance of a license under another. Equity will not countenance such a result.”).
62
See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
59
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of the agreement itself. Further, it will encourage strategic behavior by licensors, who
may be expected to include “voluntariness” clauses in future contracts.63
Interestingly, in its most recent treatment of the package licensing issue, the
Federal Circuit eschewed any discussion of the voluntariness of the license, and indeed
rejected application of the per se rule altogether. In Philips Corp. v. International Trade
Comm’n,64 the court rejected the “hornbook law” that mandatory package licensing was
patent misuse as “not supported by precedent or reason.” Philips makes no effort to
distinguish Zenith or Engel even though it seems flatly to reject their voluntariness
analysis. Despite this omission, and the resulting conflict in Federal Circuit caselaw,
there is some reason to believe Philips signals an inclination on the court to replace the
unworkable voluntariness standard with a more economically reasonable alternative.
Something similar occurs in copyright law. The practice of “block booking” –
requiring a TV station or movie theater to take a package of shows to exhibit – is illegal
per se.65 By contrast, it is perfectly legal to enter into voluntary agreements to license not
just one but many shows. This distinction is problematic for the same reasons as the
patent distinction, but like the patent distinction, it seems to drive the outcome.

63

In Leesona Corp. v. Varta Batteries, 522 F. Supp. 1304, 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the court set
some standards for determining whether such an agreement is in fact coerced. The court looked
“to see whether the license condition was the result of good faith bargaining between the parties
or was imposed on the licensee by the patent holder and whether the licensee raised objections
that were overridden by the licensor.”
64
424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
65
See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962)While the per se rule against block
booking is old, and arguably dates from a prior era of hostility to IP licensing that no longer
exists, modern courts have reaffirmed the per se rule. See, e.g., MCA Television Ltd. v. Public
Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1999).
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In these cases, courts have created sharp categories – voluntary and coerced
package licenses – that they use to divide cases between per se illegality and the rule of
reason.

4. Unilateral versus Concerted Restraints
Perhaps the most fundamental distinction in antitrust law is between unilateral
and concerted restraints. This distinction is one of the few that has a statutory basis;
section 1 of the Sherman Act governs only “contracts, combinations or conspiracies” in
restraint of trade, while unilateral actions are given more favorable treatment under
section 2. This distinction is significantly, though not perfectly, correlated with the line
between the rule of reason and per se illegality: claims involving unilateral restraints are
almost all evaluated under a rule of reason-type approach where the courts weighs the
anti- and pro-competitive effects of the challenged conduct, while many (though by no
means all) concerted acts are illegal per se.

5. Obsolete Categories
a. Price versus Nonprice
Until recently, section one jurisprudence maintained a critical distinction between
price and non-price restraints for many types of conduct. As noted, Dr. Miles condemned
vertical price restraints as per se illegal. When Sylvania removed vertical non-price
restraints from the per se category, this meant that vertical price and non-price restraints
received fundamentally different treatment.66 Plaintiffs sought to characterize the
66

See Barry J. Brett & Nancy C. Wallace, Sylvania and the Dual Distribution Dilemma, 26 N. Y.
L. SCH. L. REV. 972, 973 (1981) (“Justice Powell in Sylvania made a point of preserving both the

21

Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Lemley/Leslie

DRAFT

defendants’ agreement as price-related and defendants scrambled to present their
restraints as non-price in nature.67 In its June 2007 Leegin opinion, a five-member
majority of the Court asserted that there was “little economic justification for the current
differential treatment of vertical price and nonprice restraints.”68 With Leegin’s reversal
of Dr. Miles, courts will analyze all vertical restraints under the rule of reason. The pricenon-price categorization process should cease, at least for vertical restraints.

b. Maximum versus Minimum Pricing
In the context of horizontal price agreements, courts make no distinction based on
whether the prices set are characterized as minimum or maximum prices. The minimummaximum distinction once had resonance in vertical price-fixing cases. While the
Court’s first opinion treating resale price maintenance as per se illegal involved the fixing
of minimum prices,69 the Court later expanded this to a prohibition on maximum resale
price maintenance as well.70 The Court then backtracked, holding that vertical maximum
price fixing should be evaluated under rule of reason.71 This made the distinction between
vertically-set minimum and maximum prices critical – the latter fell in a per se category
and the former did not. However, this categorical distinction was to last but a decade, as
the recent Leegin decision brought minimum resale price maintenance within the rule of
per se rule of United States v. Topco Associates for horizontal restraints, as well as per se rules
for vertical price restraints.”).
67
HOVENKAMP (“ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE”), supra note xx at 191 (“Lawyer and judicial
resources are wasted in disputes about whether a particular restraint falls into the “price” or
“nonprice” category. But this dispute has taken center stage in vertical restraints cases because
price restraints are unlawful per se, while virtually all nonprice restraints are legal.”).
68
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007).
69
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)
70
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968).
71
State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145,
152-54 (1968)).
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reason.72 While Leegin renders the maximum-minimum categorization process irrelevant
today, this evolution reinforces the critical distinction between horizontal and vertical
restraints. Horizontal maximum price-fixing is per se illegal, while vertical maximum
price-fixing is evaluated under the rule of reason and essentially legal.

II. Problems with Reliance on Categorical Analysis.
As long as antitrust maintains differential rules, litigants will debate
categorization and companies will try to conform their conduct to the more lenient box.
While some of this discussion may help inform the antitrust analysis, courts and
practitioners have often gone overboard. In many cases, courts spend more time
determining the category than analyzing the effects of the restraint. This section
highlights several of the current problems with categorical analysis in antitrust
jurisprudence.

A. Shifting Categories
One of the problems with categorical analysis is that the boundaries of categories
shift without logic or warning. The Supreme Court recently asserted in Leegin, “the
boundaries of the doctrine of per se illegality should not be immovable.”73 This is true,
but as scholars noted even before the development of quick look, “the line between
application of the per se rule and the rule of reason has become blurred to the point that
these analytical tools are often indecipherable.”74 The evolution of quick look analysis
has made matters worse, as confusion over whether a challenged restraint falls within the
72

Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007).
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2720-21 (2007).
74
ABA RULE OF REASON MONOGRAPH, supra note xx at 10.
73
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“quick look” or requires “full-blown rule of reason analysis” introduces significant
uncertainty into antitrust litigation.75
The categorical analysis practiced by the Supreme Court is premised on shifting,
ill-defined boxes. This makes antitrust analysis unprincipled and unpredictable. This
section reviews antitrust categories that appeared stable and then shifted, leaving in their
wake categories of restraints that are nominally per se but, in reality, much more
complicated.

1. Price-Fixing
Horizontal price-fixing represents the epitome of per se illegal conduct. It is the
oldest and least controversial per se category. But the contours of what constitutes pricefixing have expanded and contracted in a manner that reduces precision and
predictability. The Court early on signaled an unwillingness to consider as a defense an
argument by cartels that they had set a reasonable price.76 In its first use of the “per se”
terminology, the Court in Socony-Vacuum held that “a combination formed for the
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price
of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.”77 The concept of
price-fixing expanded to include agreements among competitors to eliminate discounts
and the extension of credit78 as well as agreements to set maximum prices.79 Even as the
category of per se illegal horizontal price-fixing grew, the concept remained relatively

75

Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 157 F.Supp.2d 561 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
See U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); but see Appalachian Coals v. U.S., 288
U.S. 344 (1933).
77
U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940)
78
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
79
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
76
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clear: antitrust law condemns cartel arrangements in which competitors set price
collectively rather than letting competition determine price and output.
That clarity blurred with 1979’s BMI decision.80 In BMI, the Court considered the
legality of blanket licenses in which performing rights societies aggregated the
copyrighted works of thousands of composers and licensed the works to television
stations for one fee. The blanket licenses fixed prices. They also reduced transactions
costs considerably, essentially creating a new product, which was apparently desired by
most TV stations. Instead of saying that the blanket licenses did not represent a cartel
arrangement in form or function, the Court opined that “[a]s generally used in the
antitrust field, ‘price fixing’ is a shorthand way of describing certain categories of
business behavior to which the per se rule has been held applicable…. Thus, it is
necessary to characterize the challenged conduct as falling within or without that
category of behavior to which we apply the label ‘per se price fixing.’”81 The language
of BMI suggests that the per se rule had ceased to be an analytical approach and had
instead become a legal conclusion based on some sort of functional market analysis.
After BMI, price-fixing is a less clear category. The Court’s language had the
unfortunate effect of muddling the category, with the Court essentially saying that “fixing
prices is not price fixing.” While the Court was correct to conclude that blanket licensing
should not, in and of itself, fall in the per se category, the Court did little to define the
contours of this – the most critical – per se category and explain why blanket licensing
was different. As a result, the per se rule lost some vital predictability.

80
81

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
Id. at 9.
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The Court blurred the contours of the per se illegal price-fixing category further in
its Dagher opinion. In Dagher, the plaintiffs challenged the legality of joint venture
members’ setting a price for their respective branded gasoline products. The Court held
that the agreement was not per se illegal because it took place in the context of a
“legitimate joint venture” – one that had been approved by the FTC and the relevant
agencies of four states – in which the former competitors cooperated.82 The Court
reasoned that “[a]s a single entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have the
discretion to determine the prices of the products that it sells, including the discretion to
sell a product under two different brands at a single, unified price.”83 But the Court’s
reasoning hinges on the characterization of Equilon “as a single entity.” If Equilon is to
be treated as a single entity, then any debate about the per se rule versus rule of reason
analysis is completely superfluous – a single entity cannot violate section one as a matter
of law, because section one requires an agreement between separate entities, and
unilateral conduct under section two is never subject to per se condemnation. Justice
Thomas’ confusion on basic antitrust principles leaves it unclear what the Court is doing
with the per se rule in this case.
The parameters of the per se category are also distorted by the Court’s utter
failure to define what it means by “legitimate joint venture,” which is the entire basis for
excluding the oil companies’ agreement from per se condemnation. When is a joint
venture “legitimate” such that it falls outside of the per se category? The Court gives no
criteria; indeed, it “presume[s] for purposes of these cases that Equilon is a lawful joint

82

Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (“[T]he pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture
do not fall within the narrow category of activity that is per se unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman
Act…”).
83
Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
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venture.”84 But if legality turns on the defendant being a “legitimate joint venture,” then
Justice Thomas simply presumed the defendant’s agreement did not violate the Sherman
Act. Justice Thomas quotes BMI for the proposition that “[j]oint ventures and other
cooperative arrangements are ... not usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing
schemes, where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at all.”85 But
in BMI, cooperation was needed to create the new product, a blanket license. In Dagher,
there is no hint in the Court’s opinion that this joint venture was necessary to create
gasoline, hardly a new product.
The Court’s treatment of the per se and rule of reason analyses as separate legal
theories creates further problems. The Court concludes that Equilon’s price-fixing cannot
be condemned as per se illegal and it chastises the plaintiff, admonishing them that they
“should have challenged [Equilon's price unification policy] pursuant to the rule of
reason.”86 However, it precluded them from arguing that the restraint violated section one
under rule of reason analysis because they did “not put forth a rule of reason claim.”87
On remand, the Ninth Circuit was compelled to affirm the district court’s summary
judgment against the plaintiffs, who were never allowed to make a rule of reason
argument.88 The Court’s reasoning is seriously flawed. The per se rule and rule of
reason are modes of analysis, not separate causes of action. Just because one mode of
analysis may not be appropriate does not preclude condemnation under another test. The

84

Dagher, 547 U.S. at __
Dagher, 547 U.S. at __ (quoting Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979)).
86
Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
87
Dagher, 547 U.S. at __.
88
Dagher v. Saudi Refining Inc., 466 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment
against plaintiffs).
85
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cause of action (an unreasonable restraint of trade) and the remedy (trebled damages and
appropriate injunction relief) are exactly the same.
The Court’s approach creates perverse and inefficient incentives. Following BMI
and Dagher, plaintiffs may be less certain whether conduct that appears to be per se
illegal will be held so by courts. It is hard to guess correctly; after all, the Ninth Circuit
had held that Texaco and Shell Oil’s pricing conduct in Dagher was per se illegal.89
Thus, in the wake of Dagher, savvy plaintiffs will not rely solely on per se arguments.
Rather, they will develop cases under both per se and rule of reason theories. But if a
plaintiff has to argue both per se and rule of reason from the start in order to prevent the
court from changing the mode of analysis and refusing to allow the plaintiff leave to
pursue a formerly per se case under a rule of reason analysis, then every plaintiff will
have to go to the expense of pleading and developing a rule of reason case.90 This
undermines the efficiency purpose of the per se rule.

2. Group Boycotts
Initially, the Supreme Court declared group boycotts to be per se illegal. In
Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,91 Klor’s, a San Francisco department store,
sued its down-the-street rival for convincing several manufacturers of consumer
electronics and other household appliances to join a conspiracy to cease supplying Klor’s
with their products. Without using the precise words “per se illegality,” the Court
nonetheless articulated a per se rule against such concerted action: “Group boycotts, or

89
90

Dagher, 547 U.S. at (citing Dagher v. Saudi Refining, Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1116 (2004))

While this occurred before Dagher to some degree, the Court’s approach in Dagher can only exacerbate
the problem.
91

359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the
forbidden category. They have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable
in the specific circumstances…”92 That is the essence of per se illegality: the conduct
falls in a “forbidden category” so courts denounce it without considering the
reasonableness of the specific restraint at issues because it is condemned categorically.
Lower courts interpreted Klor’s as putting group boycotts in the per se category.93
The Court later began to erode the contours of the per se category for group
boycotts. In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing
Co.,94 a case involving a member firm’s expulsion from a buyers’ cooperative, the Court
cast doubt on this per se categorization. First, after noting that “‘[g]roup boycotts’ are
often listed among the classes of economic activity that merit per se invalidation under §
1,” the Court hedged by saying, “Exactly what types of activity fall within the forbidden
category is, however, far from certain.”95 The Court even quoted Lawrence Sullivan’s
famous observance that “there is more confusion about the scope and operation of the per
se rule against group boycotts than in reference to any other aspect of the per se
doctrine,”96 apparently without appreciating that it was the source of the confusion.
Second, the Court attempted to define the boundaries of the per se category for
group boycotts. As the Ninth Circuit aptly summarized, “Northwest Wholesale identified
three characteristics as indicative of per se illegal boycotts: (1) the boycott cuts off access
to a supply, facility, or market necessary to enable the victim firm to compete; (2) the
92

Id. at 212.
Walker Distributing Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1963) (“Group
boycotts are just as illegal under the Sherman Act as group price fixing.”) (citing Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)).
94
472 U.S. 284 (1985)
95
472 U.S. at 293-94.
96
Id. (quoting Lawrence Sullivan, Law of Antitrust 229-230 (1977).)
93
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boycotting firm possesses a dominant market position; and (3) the practices are not
justified by plausible arguments that they enhanced overall efficiency or competition.”97
Defining the parameters of the per se category in this fashion is peculiar because market
power and efficiency justifications are the hallmarks of rule of reason analysis. Under
this legal test for group boycotts, courts must apply the rule of reason in order to
determine whether the per se rule applies. In short, this approach ceases to be per se98 if
group boycotts are subject to per se condemnation only after courts have performed a
modified rule of reason inquiry.
Accordingly, it might be tempting to conclude that group boycotts are analyzed
under the rule of reason, despite the Court’s imposition of a per se label. This would not
be unprecedented. For example, the Court continues to refer to tying arrangements as per
se illegal despite the fact that tie-ins are not subject to categorical condemnation and
receive treatment that is, in reality, a structured rule of reason analysis.99
Yet courts still do sometimes condemn group boycotts without elaborate inquiry
and without permitting the defendants to proffer any defense and without marching
through the Northwest Wholesale factors.100 For example, in Federal Trade Commission
v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association,101 in which trial lawyers boycotted working
as court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants unless the D.C. government increased

97

Hahn v. Oregon Physicians’ Serv., 868 F.2d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 1988).
Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, The Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions for
Anticompetitive Litigation, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 757, 774 (1992) (“A per se rule that applies only
when a defendant has market power and cannot show procompetitive effects is no per se rule at
all.”).
99
See infra notes __ to __ and accompanying text.
100
For an example of a decision that applied Northwest Wholesale and still found the per se rule
to govern, see Consumers Warehouse Center, Inc. v. Intercounty Appliance Corp., __ F. Supp. 2d
__, 2007 WL 922423 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007).
101
493 U.S. 411 (1990).
98
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compensation, the Supreme Court condemned the defendants’ boycott as per se illegal
without even mentioning Northwest Wholesale. In the main text of its opinion, the Court
fails to provide any meaningful guidance as how to distinguish between per se illegal
group boycotts and those analyzed under the rule of reason. This has led to great
confusion for lower federal courts.102 However, the Court does attempt to justify its per
se label in a footnote where, in response to Justice Brennan’s dissent, the majority
“emphasize[s] that this case involves not only a boycott but also a horizontal price-fixing
arrangement-a type of conspiracy that has been consistently analyzed as a per se violation
for many decades.”103 This highlights yet another problem with categorization: the
Supreme Court’s characterization of the lawyers’ agreement as a boycott seems odd. The
agreement seems more akin to horizontal price-fixing, which the Court seems to
acknowledge in its footnote. If this justifies the per se condemnation, why categorized
the conduct as a group boycott in the first place?

Group boycotts remain subject to categorical condemnation, but the category’s
parameters are imprecise. Group boycotts are per se illegal, but the Court declines to
define what it means by the term.104 Even when the challenged conduct is a boycott, the
Court in a classic understatement has opined that refusals to deal “are not a unitary

102

See, e.g., Flash Elec., Inc. v. Universal Music & Video Dist. Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 379, 387
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The Second Circuit has echoed that caution, while noting that “[t]he scope of
the per se rule against group boycotts is a recognized source of confusion in antitrust law.”)
(citing Bogan, 166 F.3d at 515.).
103

104

Id. at n.19.

See F.T.C. v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (“Although this Court
has in the past stated that group boycotts are unlawful per se, we decline to resolve this case by
forcing the Federation's policy into the “boycott” pigeonhole and invoking the per se rule.”).
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phenomenon.”105 Yet if group boycotts are not unitary, it seems inappropriate for the
Court to treat them as a category of per se illegal restraint. Ultimately, boycott litigation
can devolve into debates about categorization instead of an analysis of anticompetitive
effects.

3. Information Exchanges
Antitrust law is understandably nervous whenever competitors get together in a
room and exchange information. Information exchange, especially information about
prices and output, can facilitate the formation of a cartel and also help cartelists detect
and prevent cheating. At the same time, trade associations can also serve valuable
procompetitive (or at least competitively neutral) purposes.106
Antitrust law has tried to accommodate these competing concerns by drawing
rough lines between exchanges of price information, which they often treat as illegal per
se, and exchanges of other forms of information, which are subject to the rule of
reason.107 Taken in the abstract, this category approach makes some sense, because it
targets the per se rule at the category of cases that seems most likely to cause competitive
harm.
The problem is that the value of information exchanges has changed over time.
An example involves standard-setting organizations (SSOs), which were virtually
unknown in the 1920s when the information exchange rules were created, but which are
105

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 543 (1978).
See, e.g., David J. Teece, Information Sharing, Cooperation, and Antitrust, 62 Antitrust L.J.
465 (1994).
107
Compare Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) with Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (exchange of
information supporting a boycott of competitors at trade association meeting violated section 1);
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
106
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now ubiquitous in the information technology industries. SSOs serve valuable
procompetitive purposes, particularly in network industries where products must work
together.108 Further, the experience of SSOs with intellectual property (IP) rights
suggests that organizations will often need to discuss and even agree on the price at
which patent owners will license rights covering the standard, or else they will be
adopting standards without any idea of whether they will be infringing a patent and thus
without knowing the total cost of that standard.109 The head of the FTC has recently
recognized the need for price information exchange in SSOs, suggesting that that
particular form of price information should be subject to the rule of reason rather than the
per se rule.110 We think the FTC’s approach makes sense, and that SSOs should be able to
exchange price information about IP licenses without facing per se liability.111 The
category distinction between price and non-price information exchange made sense when
it was developed, but it did not consider the complexities of modern technology or the
specific context of patents covering standards. The proper rule in the modern world
shouldn’t draw the sharp distinction that made sense in the 1920s.
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See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations,
90 Cal. L. Rev. 1889 (2002); Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization
Problem, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 1041 (1996).
109
For a discussion, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of
Standards (And One Not To), 48 B.C. L. Rev. 149 (2007).
110
Deborah Platt Majoras, Recognizing the Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions in
Standard Setting, http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf (September 23,
2005).
111
Cases are split on this question right now. See, e.g., Addamax Corp. v. Open Software
Found., 888 F. Supp. 274, 281, 284-85 (D. Mass. 1995), aff’d 152 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 1998)
(finding that an antitrust challenge to an SSO could proceed to trial under the rule of reason, but
ultimately finding no liability); Sony Elec. v. Soundview Tech., 157 F. Supp. 2d 180, 183 (D.
Conn. 2001); cf. In re American Soc’y of Sanitary Eng’g, 106 F.T.C. 324, 329 (1985) (consent
decree forbidding SSO from rejecting proposed standards solely because they were patented). For
a discussion of these cases, see 2 Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust § 35.6c.
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B. Categories Subject to Manipulation.
Categories may make antitrust analysis more step-wise and orderly, but at a
significant price. Even categories that seem fixed in antitrust law may change from case
to case because they are subject to manipulation by plaintiffs who want to put conduct in
a forbidden box and defendants who want it in a box that receives more lenient treatment.

1. Horizontal versus Vertical
The purpose of distinguishing horizontal and vertical restraints is judicial
efficiency. If a restraint is horizontal, then courts are more likely to condemn it under the
per se rule. This saves time and resources because such horizontal restraints are likely or
almost always likely to reduce competition in a manner that antitrust cares about, while
vertical restraints often serve legitimate business purposes. However, given the
consequences of a restraint being labeled horizontal, the focus of antitrust litigation often
shifts away from whether or not the restraint is unreasonable to whether the restraint is
properly categorized as horizontal. This section examines antitrust scenarios in which the
amount of time and energy invested in debating what label to apply to the defendants
would have been better spent determining the actual competitive effects of the restraint at
issue.

a. Cooperatives
One example of unnecessary debate over whether conduct is appropriately
characterized as vertical or horizontal involves the restraints imposed by cooperative
associations and joint ventures. The process of categorizing relationships among
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members of a cooperative association began in earnest with 1967’s Sealy decision.112
Sealy involved a joint venture that licensed mattress manufacturers to make and sell
mattresses and other bedding products under the Sealy trademark. Each of the
approximately 30 licensees was allotted an exclusive territory.113 The government
brought an action against Sealy, challenging its licensing scheme as a “conspir[acy] to
allocate mutually exclusive territory among its manufacturers.”114
To determine whether this allocation of exclusive territories violated section one
of the Sherman, the Court felt it necessary to first categorize the restraint as either
horizontal or vertical. When the Sealy case was briefed and argued, White Motor was the
governing law at the time and held that that vertical territorial restraints were entitled to
rule of reason treatment. Citing White Motor, Justice Fortas began the Sealy opinion by
noting that “this Court has distinguished between horizontal and vertical territorial
limitations. For purposes of the impact of the Sherman Act, it is first necessary to
determine whether the territorial arrangements here are to be treated as the creature of the
licensor, Sealy, or as the product of a horizontal arrangement among the licensees.”115
The Court proceeded to analyze the relationship among the licensees, which owned
“substantially all” of Sealy’s stock, and concluded that the “territorial arrangements must

112

United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
388 U.S. at __(“Sealy agreed with each licensee not to license any other person to manufacture
or sell in the designated area; and the licensee agreed not to manufacture or sell ‘Sealy products'
outside the designated area.”).
114
388 U.S. at __.
115
388 U.S. at __ (White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963)).
113
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be regarded as the creature of horizontal action by the licensees.”116 Justice Harlan, in his
dissent, argued strenuously that the restraint was properly categorized as vertical.117
The Court’s categorization process seems peculiar for two reasons. First, one of
the great ironies of Sealy is the timing of the decision. Sealy relied on White Motor to
show the importance of categorization. Yet the same day it decided Sealy, the Court
delivered its opinion in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,118 which overruled
White Motor and held vertical non-price restraints represented a new category of per se
illegal agreements. Thus, as of June 12, 1967, both horizontal non-price restraints and
vertical non-price restraints were per se illegal. If ever there were an unnecessary debate
over categorization, this was it. The Supreme Court decided Sealy without
acknowledging that Schwinn reversed White Motor and brought vertical non-price
restraints within the per se rule. Indeed, the majority opinion never even mentions
Schwinn.
Second, even ignoring Schwinn’s impending reversal of White Motor, it is unclear
how this categorization step aided the Court’s ultimate decision to condemn the territorial
restraints. The Court condemned Sealy’s non-price restraints in large part because they
were implemented in “connection with [] unlawful price-fixing.”119 Given this larger –
and, if proven, clearly per se illegal – conduct, the Court invested effort in categorizing
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388 U.S. at __.
United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350, 358 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree that
on this record the restrictive territorial arrangements here challenged are properly to be classified
as ‘horizontal,’ and hence illegal per se under established antitrust doctrine. I believe that they
should be regarded as ‘vertical’ and thus, as the Court recognizes, subject to different antitrust
evaluation.”)
118
388 U.S. 365 (1967). Schwinn itself was overruled a decade later in Sylvania.
119
388 U.S. at __ (Sealy did not appeal the district court’s injunction of its vertical price-fixing).
117
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the restraint as horizontal even though it indicates it would have condemned the restraint
regardless.120 In sum, much unnecessary effort is invested in needless categorization.
Sealy set the stage for the upcoming showdown between horizontal and vertical
non-price restraints reflected in the Supreme Court’s opinions in Topco121 and
Sylvania.122 First, in Topco, a group of smaller and medium-sized regional stores created
a new line of branded products in order to compete against national store brands. The
cooperative sought to prevent free-riding by allocating de facto exclusive territories to the
member stores. Because it viewed the relationship among the stores as horizontal, the
Supreme Court condemned the territorial restraint as per se illegal. The Court rejected
the argument that intrabrand competition could be sacrificed to increase interbrand
competition.123
Then, in Sylvania, the Supreme Court seemingly reversed course and held that a
manufacturer could impose territorial restraints in an effort to limit free-riding even
though the restraint would lessen intrabrand competition in an effort to increase
interbrand competition. The precise argument that the Court forbade in Topco, it
endorsed in Sylvania. While this may seem like a reasonable evolution in antitrust
doctrine, the Court did not actually reverse Topco; instead, it reaffirmed Topco while
limiting its per se rule to horizontal restraints. The Sylvania Court predicted that “[t]here
may be occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from horizontal
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388 U.S. at __ (“For here, the arrangements for territorial limitations are part of ‘an
aggregation of trade restraints' including unlawful price-fixing and policing. Within settled
doctrine, they are unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act without the necessity for an inquiry in
each particular case as to their business or economic justification, their impact in the marketplace,
or their reasonableness.”)
121
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
122
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
123
405 U.S. at 612.
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restrictions originating in agreements among the retailers. There is no doubt that
restrictions in the latter category would be illegal per se…”124 The Court distinguished
Sylvania because the agreement there was vertical in nature.
In the aftermath of Topco and Sylvania, how courts conceive of the relationship
will determine liability for cooperatives. Categorization becomes dispositive. Any given
restraint has the same competitive effects regardless of how courts categorize it. Yet, if it
is characterized as vertical, it will probably survive a rule of reason analysis; conversely,
if it is characterized as horizontal, it will be condemned as per se illegal. This means that
litigants and judges focus on the characterization of a challenged restraint as either
horizontal or vertical, instead of on the actual or predicted anticompetitive effects.
We don’t mean to suggest that there is nothing to the horizontal-vertical
distinction. For example, horizontal cooperative branding activity may be more likely to
be used as a cover for a cartel among preexisting market participants. But the Court has
turned an occasional difference in how the rule of reason would treat two otherwisesimilar restraints into a bright-line rule that makes the differences between those
restraints the critical inquiry.

b. Dual Distribution
The horizontal versus vertical debate also pervades antitrust litigation involving
dual distributors. Dual distribution exists when a manufacturer uses independent firms to
distribute its product to some customers, while supplying other customers directly. A
manufacturer may pursue a dual distribution strategy for several reasons. A manufacturer
may have the capacity to distribute some but not all of its product. It may “desire to
124

Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.28 (1977) (citing Topco).
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protect its reputation, by preventing distributors from engaging in opportunistic behavior.
Dual distribution also permits manufacturers to more easily monitor their distribution
systems and to provide competitive stimulus to independent distributors.”125 While there
are strong efficiency arguments for dual distribution, some observers fear that such
scheme can be used “to facilitate price squeezes on independent dealers and to implement
price discrimination.”126
Dual distribution does not in and of itself violate antitrust law.127 It would be
absurd for antitrust law to command that a manufacturer who uses independent vendors
to supply some of its customers must use independent vendors to supply all of its
customers. Nevertheless, dual distribution systems can raise antitrust concerns when the
manufacturer possesses market power and employs the dual distribution framework to
squelch competition in the downstream market.128 When a dual distributor imposes nonprice restraints, such as assigning exclusive territories, this creates an issue over how to
characterize the restraint.
While the traditional manufacturer-distributor relationship is clearly vertical, once
the manufacturer enters the same level of the supply chain as its distributors, their
relationship contains a horizontal element. As a result, “the same territorial or customer
125

Robert Zwirb, Dual Distribution and Antitrust Law, 21 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1273, 1274 n.2.
(1988)
126
Id. (citing Schwartz & Eisenstadt, Vertical Restraints, U.S. Dept. of Justice Antitrust Div.,
Econ. Policy Office Discussion Paper, at 65-71 (Dec. 2, 1982)).
127
See Dart Industries v. Plunkett Co., 704 F.2d 496, 499 (10th Cir. 1983) (“selling directly to
certain large accounts reflects a dual distribution system that standing alone, is perfectly
lawful.”); In Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842, 864 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (“We have no doubt
that there is nothing inherently evil in a dual distribution system whereby a manufacturer may sell
its own products to the customers directly through company outlets along side sic independent
dealers.”).
128
See Rea, 355 F. Supp. at 867 (“Whether dual distribution is or is not illegal or evil in and of
itself, it does become an antitrust problem in the context of its use by a company possessing
substantial market power.”)
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restrictions that were previously viewed as vertical may be reclassified as market
allocations among competitors, or horizontal restraints of trade…”129
Some courts addressing the legality of dual distribution under antitrust laws have
focused on categorizing the restraints as horizontal or vertical, instead of any
anticompetitive effects of the challenged restraints.130 This is the natural result of
Sylvania, which brought vertical non-price restraints within the rule of reason, while
maintaining per se illegality for horizontal non-price restraints:
Sylvania, in effect, requires courts in dual distribution cases to characterize the
restrictions at issue as either vertical or horizontal. At the same time, Sylvania
emphasizes that the determination of legality of distributional restraints ‘must be
based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line
drawing.’ While Sylvania requires courts to rely upon economic analysis in
deciding distribution issues, its distinction between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’
restraints forces courts to engage in the very 'formalistic line drawing' it purports
to be eschewing.131
Once the categorization becomes dispositive, litigants and judges spend their debating the
category, not the economic effects of the challenged restraint.132
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Zwirb, supra note xx at 1276 (citing Altschuler, Sylvania, Vertical Restraints, and Dual
Distribution, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 2 (1980); Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine
and Economics in the section one Labyrinth: Is Sylvania A Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REV. 1457,
1509-15 (1981); Liebeler, Intrabrand 'Cartels' Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1, 49-50
(1982)).
130
See Brett & Wallace supra note xx at 1000.
131
Zwirb, supra note xx at 1284 (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59).
132
See Zwirb, supra note xx at 1298 (“in cases decided after Sylvania, the legality of [dual
distribution] restraints turned upon a determination of whether they were ‘vertical’ or
‘horizontal.’”); id at 1319 (“By concentrating on the form of the distribution arrangement
involved, most decisions fail to evaluate distribution restraints on the basis of economic effect.”).
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The vertical-horizontal characterization remains unsettled as scholars debate
whether dual distributorships are horizontal or vertical.133 Most courts conclude that dual
distribution schemes are essentially vertical.134 However, some courts, albeit a minority
of them, have treated dual distribution systems as horizontal and, consequently, per se
illegal.135 And “[a] number of lower courts have held . . . that the presence of dual
distribution transforms intrabrand restrictions otherwise vertical in origin into horizontal
ones.”136
Courts routinely engage in a laborious process of categorizing the dual
distribution schemes as either horizontal or vertical. Some judges focus on the source of
the particular restraint within a dual distribution network,137 asking whether the
manufacturer-defendant “was acting as a supplier (in a vertical capacity) or as a
competitor distributor (in a horizontal capacity) when it allegedly [imposed a]
133

Zwirb, supra note xx at 1286 (discussing Schwartz & Eisenstadt, at 73-74).
See, e.g., Smalley & Co. v. Emerson & Cuming, Inc., 13 F.3d 366, 368 (10th Cir. 1993); Tunis
Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482 (3d Cir. 1985); Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle
House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705 (11th Cir. 1984); Graphic Prods. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th
Cir. 1983); Dart Indus. v. Plunkett Co. of Okla., 704 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1983); Davis-Watkins
Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream
Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15
(4th Cir. 1981); Copy-Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 663 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1981); Red
Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1981); Abadir & Co. v.
First Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1981)); H&B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978); Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72 (3d
Cir. 1977).
135
See, e.g., Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co., 579 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1978), appeal dismissed
per stipulation, 591 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. J.
Sosnick & Son, 162 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1980) (“It is settled that distributors cannot lawfully agree
to divide territories or customers.”);Casey, supra note xx at 438-439 (citing Pitchford v. PEPI,
Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), rem'd as to damages, 435 F.
Supp. 685 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981
(1979); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978)); see also Brett
& Wallace supra note xx at 992 (“Despite the fact that in none of the Pitchford opinions was it
explicitly so stated, one is left with the conclusion that, at least in the Third Circuit, dual
distribution restraints are illegal per se.”).
136
Krehl, 1979-2 Trade Cas. at 78,704.
137
See, e.g., Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1002-04 (5th
Cir. 1981); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15, 16-17 (1981).
134
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territory[ial] restraint.”138 Because a dual distribution scheme contains both horizontal
and vertical aspects, courts then invest their energies into determining which of these
aspects “predominates.”139 Courts then use the source of a particular restraint to
determine which aspect predominates, reasoning that “[c]onspiracies between a
manufacturer and its distributors are only treated as horizontal, however, when the source
of the conspiracy is a combination of the distributors. [But when] … the asserted
originator of the plan [is] the manufacturer, … antitrust law treats the conspiracy as a
vertical restraint, and those restrictions are now judged under the rule of reason.”140
Under this approach, the source of the restraint can be outcome determinative: “If
the restriction originates from the manufacturer, the arrangement is deemed vertical and
subject to the rule of reason. But if it is initiated by dealers or distributors acting in
concert with themselves or with the manufacturer, a horizontal conspiracy or cartel is
presumed, and the arrangement is deemed illegal per se.”141 This seems too facile. As
Professor Liebeler recognized some years ago, “The statement that someone ‘imposed’
something is not a meaningful statement in economic terms, and, in addition, is a poor
way to determine whether an arrangement is horizontal or vertical. . . . A more relevant
inquiry is whether an arrangement has the potential to restrict output.”142 Yet although the
138

L. C. Williams Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp., 625 F. Supp. 477 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
See Zwirb, supra note xx at 1316 (“Rather than focusing on the economic impact of Exxon's
distribution arrangements, the court fruitlessly attempted to determine which aspect
'predominated'--the vertical or horizontal corporate personality.”).
140
H&B Equipment Co. v. International Harvester, 577 F.2d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1978).
141
Zwirb, supra note xx at 1287.
142
Liebeler, Book Review, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1317, 1334 n. 41 (1978) (reviewing R. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978)).
This is not to say that source is irrelevant. As Herb Hovenkamp explains: “The two
distinguishing features of intrabrand restraints are that they explicitly control only a particular
manufacturer’s own brand, and powerful dealers have an incentive to impose them, sometimes
for anti-competitive purposes. So one can draw this pair of generalizations: intrabrand restraints
initiated by manufacturers acting without coercion from their dealers are almost certain to be
139
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source inquiry does not establish a restraint’s competitive effects, courts sometimes
devote significant time into determining the source of the restraint.143
The vertical-horizontal categorization process in dual distribution cases does not
lead to better results. Courts invest significant resources debating whether a particular
restraint within a dual distribution scheme is horizontal or vertical.144 And while the
vertical-horizontal characterization is often dispositive in dual distribution cases, that
inquiry says little about the actual economic effects of a given restraint within a dual
distribution framework.145
Ironically, in their zeal to categorize, some courts even perform a rule of reason
analysis in order to determine whether the restraint at issue is vertical and thus should be
analyzed under the rule of reason! In addition to examining the source of the restraint,
courts in dual distribution cases will sometimes scrutinize “the purpose and effect of the
restraint in order to determine whether the restraint was horizontal or vertical.”146 In
several cases, courts “have examined the origin, purpose and effect of the restraint and

competitive. By contrast, restraints imposed on manufacturers by powerful dealers or dealers’
groups are more likely to be anticompetitive.” HOVENKAMP (“ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE”), supra
note xx at 185. But it is wasteful to explain the source in order to characterize the restraint before
applying a rule of reason, instead of simply considering the source in order to predict the
restraint’s effect on output.
143
See Abadir, at 427 n.5 (“Thus, vertical market-distributing agreements must truly be imposed
by a supplier, in fact. Market-distributing agreements which are initiated by distributors are
horizontal, even if the supplier is nominally a party to the contract.”).
144
See Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473 (“Although a manufacturer's relationship with its
distributors has a horizontal aspect when it acts as a distributor itself, it remains primarily a
vertical relationship. A manufacturer retains some right to place restraints on its distributors to
improve its ability to compete in the product market.”).
145
Zwirb, supra note xx at 1291 (“Decisions that characterize arrangements on the basis of form
or source can hardly be described as opinions based on ‘economic effect.’”).
146
Casey, supra note xx at 444 (discussing Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d
1190, 1197 (6th Cir. 1982)).
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have then proceeded to classify it as either horizontal or vertical.”147 For example, in one
case, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that “the [dual distributor’s] restraints were vertical
because they resulted in a guaranteed year-round market for the product. Therefore, the
court concluded that the rule of reason was the appropriate standard to evaluate the dual
distributor restraints.”148 The court essentially concludes that its quick rule of reason
analysis suggests a procompetitive explanation for the restraint, and therefore argues that
the restraint must be vertical because that characterization allows the court to apply the
rule of reason. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has “conclude[d] that, in the absence of proof
of anti-competitive purpose or effect, dual distribution systems must be evaluated under
the traditional rule of reason standard.”149 This makes little sense; looking for proof of
anticompetitive effects is rule of reason analysis and finding proof of such effects
essentially establishes the prima facie case under the rule of reason.
Categorization here has become the end instead of the means. It focuses attention
on the wrong issue as courts look at the effects of the restraint to determine its category
instead of its legality. That is exactly backwards. The reason that dual distribution
schemes do not violate antitrust laws is not because they are vertical, but because they
generally do not unreasonably restrain competition. Once the court has determined that
147

Brett & Wallace supra note xx at 995-96 (citing Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc.,
585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979); Dougherty v. Continental Oil
Co., 579 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1978), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 591 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir.
1979); Westpoint Pepperell, Inc. v. Rea, 1980-2 Trade Cas. 75,739 (N.D. Cal.); Krehl v. BaskinRobbins Ice Cream Co., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 78,699 (C.D. Cal.); Amway Corp., [1976-1979
Transfer Binder] TRADE REC. REP. (CCH) i 21,574 (FTC May 8, 1979); 91 F.T.C. at 517;
Guild Wineries and Distilleries v. J. Sosnick 8c Son, 102 Cal. App. 3d 627, 162 Cal. Rptr. 87
(1980)).
148
Casey, supra note xx at 441 (discussing Abadir & Co. v. First Mississippi Corp.).
149
Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir. 1982). But note that
the court also asserted that “our inquiry focuses not on whether the vertical or horizontal aspects
of the system predominate, but rather, on the actual competitive impact of the dual distribution
system employed…” Id. at 1356.
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the challenged restraint does not unreasonably restrain competition, the section one
inquiry should end, not proceed to a categorization step that is, at best, unnecessary.
Of course, many courts do consider the effects of a challenged restraint150 and
some simply hold that restraints within dual distribution schemes are analyzed under the
rule of reason without regard to the vertical/horizontal classification.151 This rule of
reason analysis, not an artificial categorization, is how antitrust analysis of dual
distribution should be performed.152

c. Group Boycotts
The horizontal-vertical distinction also creates confusion in the application of the
per se rule to group boycotts. Although the Supreme Court had initially condemned
group boycotts as per se illegal,153 the Court’s subsequent erosion of the per se rule has
led lower courts to characterize group boycotts as either horizontal or vertical, and to
reserve per se condemnation for those concerted refusals to deal where there is
“concerted activity between two or more horizontal competitors.”154 Conversely, “[t]he
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See Red Diamond at 1004-05 (“That Liquid also distributed some of its own goods does not
alter the situation. When a producer elects to market its goods through distributors, the latter are
not, in an economic sense, competitors of the producer even though the producer also markets
some of its goods itself.”); see also See Zwirb, supra note xx at 1309 (“Red Diamond is thus
distinctive for integrating economic insights into a formalistic framework.”).
151
Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 65,284, at
69,668 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff'd, 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The better-reasoned decisions
have held that a rule of reason analysis is applicable in dual distribution systems.”); see also
Zwirb, supra note xx at 1313 (“Instead of becoming immersed in a classification controversy, the
Sixth Circuit simply stated that dual distributor restrictions are analyzed by the rule of reason.”)
(discussing Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982)).
152
See infra notes __ to __ and accompanying text.
153
Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). For a discussion of the
history, see supra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
154
Cascade Cabinet Co. v. Western Cabinet & Millwork, 710 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir.1983);
Brookins v. Intl Motor Contest Ass’n, 219 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[P]recedent limits the
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per se rule is never applied automatically when the concerted refusal to deal is vertical,
rather than horizontal.”155 This raises the issue of what makes a boycott “horizontal.”
Some courts hold that the challenged “boycott must originate among the horizontal
competitors,”156 just as courts have held in the dual distribution context. Others say
merely that “[s]ome horizontal concert of action must be taken against the victims of the
restraint in order for the per se rule to apply.”157
Importing the horizontal versus vertical dichotomy into boycott jurisprudence is
particularly cumbersome – even more so than with territorial restraints – because
boycotts often involve multiple relationships. For example, in Klor’s, the ringleader of
the alleged conspiracy (Broadway Hale) was a competitor of the plaintiff, but was not in
a horizontal relationship with any of the other conspirators, none of whom were rivals of
the plaintiff.158 Despite this, some lower courts focus on the “obvious horizontal
character to the conspiracy” in Klor’s.159 Yet, under the reasoning of Sealy, the concerted
refusal to deal would seem to be vertically driven. Broadway-Hale was neither controlled
by nor competing against any other member of the conspiracy. At the end of the day, we
are left with courts investing their time considering whether a particular group boycott is
horizontal, instead of whether it is having anticompetitive effects.160

per se rule in the boycott context to cases involving horizontal agreements among direct
competitors.” (quoting Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998))).
155
Tominaga v. Shepard, 682 F.Supp. 1489, 1495 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (citation omitted).
156
Flash Elec., Inc. v. Universal Music & Video Dist. Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 379, 388 n.4
(E.D.N.Y. 2004).
157
Tominaga v. Shepard, 682 F.Supp. 1489, 1495 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (citing Gough v. Rossmoor
Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 387 (9th Cir.1978)).
158
Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
159
Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter’s Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 590-91 (8th
Cir. 1987).
160
See Rossi, 156 F.3d at 462.
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d. Summary
The disparate treatment between vertical and horizontal restraints is theoretically
a function of their different economic effects. The Court reiterated this year in Leegin
that its “recent cases formulate antitrust principles in accordance with the appreciated
differences in economic effect between vertical and horizontal agreements…”161 Thus,
according to the Court, restraints denominated as vertical should receive more deferential
treatment than those adjudged to be horizontal.162 While such an approach is defensible
as a theoretical matter, the practical effect has been to convert antitrust litigation into a
laborious process of characterization and mischaracterization in which the actual
economic effects of the challenged restraint play a minor role in the antitrust analysis.
The differences between vertical and horizontal conduct can sometimes be significant,
but they are not the beginning and the end of the inquiry. Making them so simply leads
to fights over which box should hold conduct that often doesn’t easily fit into any box.

2. Voluntary versus Coerced.
The distinction between voluntary and coerced patent licenses we identified
above163 is naturally manipulable. While in the abstract there may be some transactions
that are clearly voluntary and others that are coerced, in some sense all contracts could be
characterized as either voluntary (the licensee did after all agree to the terms) or coerced
161

Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007).
See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007) (“In later
cases, however, the Court rejected the approach of reliance on rules governing horizontal
restraints when defining rules applicable to vertical ones. See, e.g., Business Electronics, supra, at
734, 108 S.Ct. 1515 (disclaiming the “notion of equivalence between the scope of horizontal per
se illegality and that of vertical per se illegality”); Maricopa County, supra, at 348, n. 18, 102
S.Ct. 2466 (noting that “horizontal restraints are generally less defensible than vertical
restraints”).”).
163
See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
162
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(licensors presumably extracted as much value as they could from the licensees, and they
would not have needed the license were it not for at least an implicit threat of patent suit).
Further, even if there is a theoretical distinction we might want to maintain, as a practical
matter the question of coercion will be effectively impossible to prove in court. The
parties might reasonably be expected to contradict each other in testifying on the issue,
either because one is lying or because they have different perspectives on voluntariness.
Nor will a contract recital of voluntariness tell us much about the actual state of affairs,
since someone coerced into signing a license presumably can be coerced into signing one
that recites that it is voluntary. The ability of licensees to acquire individual rather than
group patent licenses may bear on voluntariness, though cases such as this often involve
package licenses offered at a discount off of the collective price of individual licenses.
Something similar is likely in the copyright block booking cases. Even if we
could determine in extreme cases whether a package license of copyrighted works was
voluntary or not, we will face intermediate cases in which copyright owners offer
package discounts. Unless we are willing to ban all package discounts of informationbased goods – something antitrust law is clearly unwilling to do in other areas – the
“voluntary vs. coerced” distinction will be subject to characterization problems.
It is true that there are some limited circumstances in which coerced package
licensing or block booking may have negative consequences that voluntary deals would
not. Licensees dealing with a patent pool, for instance, will likely be willing to take
licenses to patents essential to the technology but would not voluntarily agree to take
licenses to other patents that are competitive with rather than complementary to their own
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products.164 But the fact that there is something to the distinction in theory doesn’t mean
that it will work in practice. Licensors who want to coerce agreement to package terms
will try to manipulate the transaction to make it appear voluntary, and licensees will often
have the opposite incentive. The result is the creation of boxes that map imperfectly, if at
all, to actual economic effects. Here, too, we would be better off inquiring into those
economic effects than into whether the conduct fits into an artificial category the law has
created.

3. Unilateral v. Concerted Conduct
The distinction between unilateral and concerted action is fundamental because it
serves to distinguish section 1 from section 2 of the Sherman Act. This is important
because section 2 does not treat any unilateral conduct as per se illegal. And if two
competitors merge into one company, we apply an alternative rule, derived from section
7 of the Clayton Act: whether the merger is likely to substantially lessen competition or
lead to a monopoly.165
The fundamental distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct makes a
good deal of sense as a matter of antitrust policy. Unilateral acts have the potential for
productive efficiencies generally lacking in agreements between competitors. They are
also much harder to police, since companies have to make pricing and output decisions,
while they don’t have to agree with competitors. For both reasons, the administrative and
164

In its most recent treatment of the issue, the Federal Circuit rejected the essentiality criterion
in evaluating patent pools. U.S. International Trade Comm’n v. Philips, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir.
2005). This was a mistake. Limiting a pool to essential patents serves the useful purpose of
permitting competition where it is possible. But just because we believe the essential-nonessential patent distinction is important doesn’t mean it, or any other category, should necessarily
be determinative.
165
15 U.S.C. § 18.
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error costs are much greater when policing unilateral acts than when policing agreements.
Accordingly, the law treats agreements, especially among competitors, much more
harshly than unilateral conduct.
The fact that this distinction makes sense does not prevent it from being
manipulated, however. Companies aware of the distinction naturally seek to characterize
their conduct as unilateral rather than concerted. This has led to difficult evidentiary
questions where defendants act in parallel, but deny that they have acted in concert.166 It
has also led to the creation of boxes in which we assume without detailed investigation
that concerted action either does or does not exist. Four examples follow.

a. Is it a Joint Venture? Collaborations Among Competitors
Joint ventures blur the sharp division between unilateral and concerted action. Is a
joint venture between competitors simply an agreement between independent entities,
subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act? Or is it effectively the creation of a new merged
entity subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act? Courts have taken both positions.167 And
whichever position courts take, they then must face the separate problem of whether and
how to police the dealings between the joint venture and its parents. That relationship
could be characterized either as dealing among competitors (subject to section 1) or as
dealings within a corporate entity (subject to Copperweld and therefore virtually immune
166

See Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 2006) (reversing
district court determination that concerted conduct could not be proven); William H. Page,
Communication and Concerted Action, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L. Rev. 405 (2007) (discussing these
difficulties, and proposing that plaintiffs must prove that the defendants have actually
communicated with each other).
167
Compare Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1983)
(evaluating joint venture under section 1) with United States v. Penn-Olin Corp., 378 U.S. 158
(1964) (evaluating joint venture under section 7 of the Clayton Act). Cf. FTC Competitor
Collaboration Guidelines (1998) (evaluating both approaches).
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from scrutiny).168 Characterization of the joint venture can determine the legality of both
the venture itself and its agreements with others. This problem of characterization was
central to the Supreme Court’s recent Dagher case. The Ninth Circuit had held that two
oil companies that formed a joint venture, ending competition between them and jointly
refining and marketing gasoline, violated section 1 when they agreed to set the price for
the oil produced by the joint venture.169 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a joint
venture did not engage in price fixing when it set the prices at which its members would
sell through the venture.170 The difference was entirely one of characterization: are two
companies that forego competition by entering into a joint venture nonetheless two
companies agreeing on price, or is the joint venture a single entity making its own pricing
decision?
The irony of this characterization debate to an economist is that it arguably
shouldn’t matter at all. Transactions costs economics thinks of a firm as a collection of
actors organized into a group because it is more efficient to do so than to deal with each
other through outside contracts.171 A change in the legal rules that affects outside
transactions differently than integration into a firm should merely prompt integration or
disintegration, not a change in the actual behavior of the actors.172 This doesn’t mean
168

Guidelines, supra note __, at __.
Dagher v. Saudi Refining, Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004).
170
Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S.Ct. 1276, 1279 (2006).
171
The founding father of transactions costs economics is Oliver Williamson. See, e.g., See
Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance 233-34 (Oxford 1996); Oliver E.
Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 30 (Collier Macmillan 1985). TCE is
itself an offshoot of the Ronald Coase’s theory of the firm. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of
the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937), reprinted in Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and
the Law 33 (Chicago 1988). For a flavor of the more general literature on the theory of the firm
and how law affects firm structure, see generally Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of The
Nature of the Firm on the Theory of Corporate Law, 18 J. Corp. L. 213 (1993).
172
For an example, see, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Brett McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis:
Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 575.
169
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antitrust should never treat outside firms differently than inside divisions, of course, but it
does suggest that if we can’t agree whether to characterize a cooperative or joint venture
as a single entity or as a group of autonomous would-be competitors, it may not be worth
wasting a lot of time trying to precisely delineate this boundary. In an ideal world, we
would analyze the economic effect of the venture without regard to how it is
characterized.173

b. Dealer Terminations
The second example involves dealer termination cases. The courts had established
in a series of cases involving termination of dealers by distributors that a distributor
cannot agree with one dealer to terminate another dealer; to do so is illegal per se.174 The
worry is that dealers have an incentive to eliminate price-cutting competitors, and if they
can collectively pressure the distributor to terminate the price-cutter, they can enforce
higher retail prices.175 Nor can distributors agree with the price-cutting dealer to stop
discounting, because doing so is a concerted agreement to set minimum resale prices, and

173

The FTC took a significant step towards letting the economic effects rather than the form of
the venture determine the outcome in its Competitor Collaboration Guidelines. Guidelines, supra
note __, at __. But courts have yet to take the same approach.
To be fair, the result of the Dagher case is not expressly to insulate joint venture pricing
from review, but rather to apply the rule of reason. We think the rule of reason may well be the
right test here. But the references to the joint venture as a single entity making a unilateral pricing
decision suggests that the Copperweld rule of virtually per se legality may end up applying to
such arrangements.
174
See, e.g., Cernuto,Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir .1979); Bostick Oil Co.
v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207, 1213-15 (4th Cir. 1983). This rule survived Monsanto v.
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); that decision set a high pleading standard for
proof of agreement, but maintained the rule that such agreement, if proven, is illegal per se.
175
Whether this concern actually makes sense is open to question, but that’s not directly relevant
to our point in this section.
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therefore was also illegal per se until 2007, and is now judged under the rule of reason.176
In Monsanto v. Spray-Rite,177 however, the Court held that a distributor who could not
agree with its dealer was nonetheless free to unilaterally announce a set of rules with
which all dealers must comply and to terminate dealers who fail to do so. Further, it set a
high standard of proof for agreement in such a case, requiring evidence of “a conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.”178 In a
case such as this, the line between a dealer-distributor agreement and a unilateral
restriction starts to blur. Agree with dealers on a policy and your conduct is illegal per se.
Announce the identical policy yourself, even if everyone knows that you are responding
to pressure from dealers, and it’s not.179 That distinction makes little sense.180
The Court’s decision four years later in Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics
added a new dimension to this artificial distinction.181 That case held that agreements to
terminate a price cutter are only per se illegal if there is also an “agreement on price
levels.”182 It therefore took the per se illegal box created by Monsanto – agreements to
terminate dealers – and further carved it into two sub-boxes, one for agreements that
specifically set a price and another for agreements that don’t. This distinction makes
even less sense than Monsanto’s. Termination of price cutters will serve to stabilize a

176

Colgate & Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (per se rule); Leegin Creative Leather
Prods. v. PSKS, 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007).
177
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 752.
178
Id. at 768.
179
For a discussion of the evidentiary problems in drawing this line, see Herbert Hovenkamp,
Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 468 (3d ed. 2005).
180
See also Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 5,
73-78 (2004). Meese goes on to argue that this justifies per se legality for all vertical conduct.
Id. at 78-80. We disagree. Conduct that is sometimes anticompetitive and sometimes legitimate
should not be per se illegal, but neither should it be per se legal.
181
485 U.S. 717 (1988).
182
Id. at 728.
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horizontal cartel among manufacturers even without an explicit agreement on price
between each manufacturer and distributor. And after Business Electronics,
manufacturers and distributors can agree to terminate any particular price cutter – and
even agree to terminate them expressly because they cut prices – so long as they don’t
actually agree on what price level is too low. Perhaps Business Electronics really wanted
to eliminate the per se rule entirely from vertical cases – the Court took a big step in that
direction this Term183 – but there is no logic to the line they in fact ended up drawing.

c.

Conditional Refusals to Deal

A final, related example involves a series of efforts by the makers of durable
goods to capture a previously competitive aftermarket for parts and service for their
goods. In a series of cases involving the makers of photocopiers and computer systems,
courts faced restrictions imposed by the antitrust defendant on the use of independent
service organizations.184 These restrictions often took the form of rules that refused to
provide spare parts to ISOs or to customers who used ISOs. Plaintiffs characterized this
as a tying arrangement, something that the law treats as concerted action. Defendants
responded by arguing that their policy was unilateral and did not require agreement with
the customers. In fact, the answer is somewhere in between – the rule imposed by the

183

Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007). Some have argued that
vertical restraints of this sort can never be anticompetitive. See Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust,
supra note __, at __; Bork, Antitrust Paradox, supra note __, at __. But as Judge Richard
Posner has explained, such conduct can in some circumstances be anticompetitive. Richard A.
Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 229 (2005); Richard A.
Posner, Vertical Restrictions and “Fragile” Monopoly, 50 Antitrust Bull. 499, 500-503 (2005)
(discussing Standard Fashions exclusive dealing example).
184
In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Data General
v. Grumman Sys. Support, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak,
125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
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durable goods manufacturer is not really an agreement,185 but neither is it truly a
unilateral refusal to deal. Rather, it is a conditional refusal to deal, a hybrid that – like the
conditional rules in Monsanto -- is neither truly unilateral nor truly concerted.186 An
antitrust rule that creates a sharp division between unilateral and concerted conduct has
difficulty dealing with intermediate cases such as conditional refusals to deal.

d.

Who Is a Single Actor?

A final oddity presented by the sharp distinction between unilateral and concerted
conduct involves determining what constitutes a single entity. In Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube,187 the Court held – quite sensibly – that a corporation could not
conspire with itself. In that case, the defendants were a parent corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiary. The Court determined that they had “a complete unity of interest,”
and so should not be treated as conspirators for antitrust purposes. This makes sense; a
parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary were unlikely to compete with each other in the
absence of an agreement. In fact, it makes sufficient sense that an outsider might wonder
that the case was brought at all. The reason has to do with the distinction between
unilateral and concerted conduct. Because agreements are treated more harshly than
unilateral conduct, there is a strong incentive for antitrust plaintiffs to find a conspiracy
somewhere in order to take advantage of a more advantageous legal rule.
Copperweld closes the door on efforts to game that particular box, but it opens
another. What if the parent company holds less than complete ownership in another

185

See Christopher R. Leslie, Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements and Antitrust's
Concerted Action Requirement, 60 OHIO ST .L.J. 1773 (1999).
186
For elaboration, see 1 Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP & Antitrust §13.4b.
187
467 U.S. 752 (1984).
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company? If it owns a majority share in and exercises control over that company,
Copperweld should still apply, but if only one of those things is true, the case for treating
the two as a single economic entity gets weaker. And we can push the line even further;
the Seventh Circuit has held that the National Basketball Association is a single entity,
not a collection of different teams, for antitrust purposes, even though the teams are
separately owned and retain control over most of their decisions.188 Chicago
Professional Sports shows that it is just as easy for defendants as plaintiffs to game the
unilateral-concerted divide.189

C. Categories That Lie
The point of putting particular types of conduct into the per se and rule of reason
boxes is to identify a set of cases that can be resolved without a detailed inquiry into the
facts or the competitive effects of each individual practice. In at least one important set of
cases, however – tying arrangements – federal courts call a practice per se illegal without
in fact treating it as per se illegal.190 Tying arrangements are listed as a per se category in
hundreds of antitrust cases. But unlike other categories of trade restraints treated as per
se illegal, the per se test as applied to tying arrangements requires the plaintiff to prove
four elements: “(1) the tying and tied goods are two separate products; (2) the defendant
has market power in the tying product market; (3) the defendant affords consumers no

188

Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996).
189
For a discussion of the complexities of determining whether entities in a corporate
relationship are one actor or two, see, e.g., Dean V. Williamson, Organization, Control and the
Single Entity Defense in Antitrust, available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2200&context=alea (working paper April
2007).
190
As we noted supra notes __-__ and accompanying text, group boycotts may also be an
example of a category that lies, depending on how one interprets the group boycott cases.
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choice but to purchase the tied product from it; and (4) the tying arrangement forecloses a
substantial volume of commerce.”191
This test for per se illegality is not truly a per se test. As one of the authors has
explained “tying arrangements are really only nominally per se illegal. The per se rule
against tie-ins is nominal because: (1) it requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
has market power over the tying product, (2) it requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that a
not insubstantial dollar volume of commerce in the tied product market is affected, and
(3) it permits the defendant to argue that she has a legitimate business justification for
imposing a tie-in. … None of these conditions is present in a true per se scenario.”192
The traditional per se test requires no showing of market power,193 and defendants whose
conduct falls in other per se categories are not able to argue that business rationales
validate their conduct, but tying defendants can.194
Despite the fact that under the clear language of the so-called per se test for tying,
tie-ins are not, in fact, per se illegal, the Court refuses to alter the categorical label.
Although writing for a four-Justice concurrence in Jefferson Parish, Justice O’Connor
argued that “[t]he time has …come to abandon the ‘per se’ label” applied to tie-ins,195 a
191

U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984)). If the plaintiff cannot establish these four elements, she can still argue that
the tie-in violates the rule of reason.
192
Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam's Razor: A Simple
Explanation of Tying Arrangements, 78 TULANE LAW REVIEW 727, 735 (2004).
193
Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Where a
plaintiff proves conduct that falls within a per se category, nothing more is needed for liability;
the defendants' power, illicit purpose and anticompetitive effect are all said to be irrelevant.”)
(citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129
(1940)).
194
Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North American, Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987)
(“Technically, there is no ‘violation’ of the Sherman Act if the defendant prevails on a business
justification defense.”).
195
466 U.S. at 35.
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majority of the Court asserted that “[i]t is far too late in the history of our antitrust
jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an
unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable ‘per se.’”196 So
the Court maintained the per se label, but added rule of reason elements to the so-called
per se test for tying.197
While it may seem of no moment whether tie-ins are called per se illegal so long
as they are evaluated under their own modified rule of reason, the miscategorization of
tying arrangements has consequences. Although the Jefferson Parish majority claimed
that it cared about “competitive consequences,” not labels,198 categories matter in
antitrust. Once the per se label is attached to conduct, antitrust liability attaches without
proof of anti-competitive effects. Courts across most circuits have held that once the per
se elements of a tying claim are established, “tying arrangements are illegal in and of
themselves, without any requirement that the plaintiff make a showing of unreasonable
competitive effect.”199 The ill-placed per se label used in tying jurisprudence requires the
court to define product markets, examine market power, and consider business
justifications, yet not to examine the one factor that matters most: whether the tie-ins
196

Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984).
See Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 833 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir.1987) (The
Jefferson Parish Court “rather than abandoning the per se rule against tying, chose to limit
antitrust liability for tie-ins by insisting on a showing of actual market power in the tying
product.”).
198
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 n.34 (1984) (“The legality of
petitioners’ conduct depends on its competitive consequences, not whether it can be labeled
“tying.” If the competitive consequences of this arrangement are not those to which the per se
rule is addressed, then it should not be condemned irrespective of its label.”).
199
Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 540-41(9th Cir. 1983) (citing
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969).); Town Sound
and Custom Tops, 959 F.2d at 477 (holding that if the plaintiff satisfies the three-part per se tying
test, “then the defendant's tying practices are automatically illegal without further proof of
anticompetitive effect”); Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984) (If
the court applies the per se approach then the “tying arrangement is illegal” without a showing
that it “restrain[s] competition unreasonably.”) (citations omitted).
197
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unreasonably restrained trade. This ill-conceived and outmoded categorization creates
the worst of the both worlds – the cost of the rule of reason without its precision.200 The
modified per se rule also creates a disconnect between section 1 and section 2 tying
claims, since under section 2 more will be required.
To be sure, there might be an argument for a “middle” category if we thought that
tying arrangements were anticompetitive if but only if the defendant had market power.
But we’re not persuaded that this two-sided correspondence between market power and
anticompetitive effect is in fact true.201 The effect of this mischaracterization is that many
courts do not sufficiently consider the likely (or actual) competitive effects of a
challenged tie. Instead, they condemn tying arrangements that are likely to have no
anticompetitive effects, simply because the particular tie-in satisfies the elements of
tying’s so-called per se test. In our view, tying belongs in the rule of reason box. But even
if it doesn’t – if there is a strong correspondence between market power and
anticompetitive effect – courts should be up front about the creation of this intermediate
category, rather than diluting the per se rule by calling things per se illegal that really
aren’t.

200

See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 34-35 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“As a result, tying doctrine incurs the costs of a rule of reason
approach without achieving its benefits: the doctrine calls for the extensive and time-consuming
economic analysis characteristic of the rule of reason, but then may be interpreted to prohibit
arrangements that economic analysis would show to be beneficial. Moreover, the per se label in
the tying context has generated more confusion than coherent law because it appears to invite
lower courts to omit the analysis of economic circumstances of the tie that has always been a
necessary element of tying analysis.”).
201
For an argument justifying a version of that distinction on the basis that tying conspiracies
are more harmful than unilateral tying, see Christopher R. Leslie, Tying Conspiracies, 48 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 2247 (2007). But cf. Jean Tirole, The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer, 1 Comp.
Pol’y Int’l 1 (2005) (arguing for a unified treatment of all tying cases). But Leslie’s argument
deals only with horizontal conspiracies among competitors to impose ties on their customers. It
does not extend to the full scope of the current “per se” rule in section 1 tying cases.
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Tying is an example of a category that lies, because it claims to be a per se
rule but in fact involves many of the indicia of a rule of reason inquiry. Interestingly,
Michael Carrier has suggested that rule of reason analysis itself may be an example in the
opposite direction. Under the rule of reason, courts are supposed to balance the
procompetitive benefits of conduct against its potential for anticompetitive harm. Carrier
studies cases actually decided under section one and concluded that they tend to
substitute burden-shifting presumptions for real balancing analysis.202 He finds that
courts dismiss most cases on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to show a significant
anticompetitive effect. To some extent, Carrier’s analysis may simply reflect evidence
produced in the balancing inquiry, rather than a rejection of that inquiry. For example, if
the plaintiff cannot prove market power in a section one case, it arguably makes sense not
to proceed further under the rule of reason, since section one usually presumes harm only
if a plaintiff has market power.203 But if Carrier is correct that more is going on here, rule
of reason analysis may itself be a category that lies.

D. Categories That Are Nonsensical
Most of the categories we discuss in this paper, however problematic, are
designed to get at distinctions that have some logical basis. Occasionally, however,
antitrust courts adopt categories that simply make no sense. An example is the longstanding rule set out in General Electric v. United States that distinguishes between sales
202

Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1265. Cf.
Elhauge, supra note __ at 253 (challenging the way that cost-benefit analysis is applied in monopolization
cases).
203
But see Dennis Carlton, Market Definition: Use and Abuse, 3 Comp. Pol’y Int’l 1 (2007) (arguing that
market power is an elusive concept that should not play a major role in antitrust analysis).
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and “licenses” of patented products.204 Antitrust law traditionally made resale price
maintenance – the control over the price at which a buyer of a product can resell it –
illegal per se.205 But in General Electric, the Court said that that rule would be reversed if
the supplier did not actually sell the product, but merely “licensed” it to the buyer. In that
circumstance, even if the supplier physically transfers the goods to the buyer, the Court
said price controls imposed by the supplier on the buyer were legal per se.206
There are a number of problems with the General Electric approach, not least the
fact that the supplier and buyer in that case were actually competitors, and so allowing
price control directly facilitated a cartel.207 Courts have criticized and limited General
Electric,208 and four Justices voted to overrule it in the 1940s,209 but it remains the law. In
this article, however, our concern is not so much with the unfortunate substantive
dimensions of the General Electric rule as with the illogic of the categorical distinction
between sales and licenses. Our experience with a similar distinction in software
contracting is not promising: it has become an artificial distinction designed to reach
particular legal results, not a distinction grounded in actual fact.210 The problem is even
worse in antitrust law. It is trivial to manipulate the sale-license distinction, and the fact
that the consequences of the distinction are so sharp – per se legality versus per se
204

272 U.S. 476 (1926).
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). In 2007, the Supreme
Court overruled Dr. Miles in Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., __ S.Ct. __ (June 28,
2007) (holding that resale price maintenance should be governed by the rule of reason).
206
General Electric, 272 U.S. at 490. Because General Electric created a rule of per se legality,
the recent decision in Leegin to apply the rule of reason to other resale price maintenance
schemes does not eliminate the effects of the sale-license distinction.
207
See 2 Hovenkamp et al., supra note __, at §31.1b, 31.1c.
208
See id. § 31.2.
209
Line Material Co. v. United States, 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
210
For discussions of the artificiality of this distinction, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al.,
Software and Internet Law 317-24 (3d ed. 2006); David Nimmer, The Metamorphosis of
Contract Into Expand, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 17 (1999); Jessica Litman, The Tales That Article 2B
Tells, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 931 (1998).
205
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illegality – provide ample reason to do so.211 Worse, there is no real consequence
underlying the distinction. Transactions are not systematically less likely to be
anticompetitive if structured as licenses rather than sales. We have created a rule that not
only encourages manipulation and can facilitate cartels, but which has no affirmative
value.212

E. Different Category Labels For the Same Conduct
In the examples we have discussed so far, the courts have established rules that
put cases into different boxes based on factual differences. We have argued that those
factual differences are often not as important as the courts seem to think, that they are
subject to manipulation, and that they can end up changing over time in surprising ways.
In some cases, though, the problem is even worse. In the examples we consider in this
section, the very same conduct will be treated differently by the courts depending on
whether the courts give them one label or another.

1.

Predatory Bundling

One important set of cases involves the bundling of different products. Bundling
of two different products has traditionally been treated under the law of tying
arrangements. As noted above, ties are illegal if they are coerced, the defendant has

211

Even after Leegin, which changed the rule against resale price maintenance from a per se rule
to a rule of reason, there is still substantial value to an antitrust defendant of fitting into the per se
legality box of General Electric.
212
In one context, the Robinson-Patman Act, the statute appears to require this distinction,
because it applies only to sales. See Laitram Machinery, Inc. v. Carnitech A/S, 884 F.Supp. 1074,
1079-80 (E.D. La. 1995). We think that’s a silly distinction too, but since it is one created by
Congress, only Congress can undo it. General Electric was foisted on the world by the courts,
and the courts can undo it.
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market power in the tying product, and there is an effect on the market for the tied
product. While coercion normally involves a contractual requirement that the customer
purchase product A if they want product B, courts have been willing to expand the
concept of a tying arrangement to cases in which there is no express requirement but in
which the financial incentives to purchase the products together are so strong that it is
impractical to buy the goods separately.213
A more recent line of cases starting with LePage’s v. 3M214 treats the same sort of
conduct under the label “predatory bundling.” In LePage’s, the defendant, 3M, made
hundreds of diverse products. In some markets, it possessed considerable market power,
while in others it faced significant competition. 3M had dominated the market for
transparent tape, but was facing serious competition from LePage’s. In response, 3M
devised a “bundled rebate” program whereby retailers would receive ever increasing
rebates as they met targets by purchasing products across 3M's various product lines. As
a result, even if retailers saved money by purchasing their tape from LePage’s, they
would lose significantly more in rebates across non-tape products that 3M had bundled
with the tape.
The case illustrates how antitrust labels can be manipulated. The Third Circuit en
banc affirmed the jury verdict against 3M, holding that predatory bundling can violate
section two. 3M attempted to characterize LePage’s claim as one of predatory pricing.
213

See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 50 (1962). Similarly, the first United
States v. Microsoft case involved charges that Microsoft had imposed a de facto exclusive dealing
arrangement by imposing a “per processor” license, under which computer makers could install
whatever operating system they liked, but were obligated to pay Microsoft for each computer
they shipped whether or not it contained the Microsoft OS. 1995 WL 505998 (D.D.C. 1995).
The Antitrust Division alleged that the effect of this agreement was to force computer makers to
load only Microsoft software, since to load other software they would have had to pay twice.
214

324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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This is hardly surprising given that the Supreme Court has made predatory pricing a
disfavored claim, which rarely succeeds. Alternatively, 3M’s bundled rebate scheme
could also be characterized as a tying arrangement since retailers who desired non-tape
products from 3M were economically compelled to purchase tape as well given the rebate
structure. Importantly, the legal standards the court applies to predatory bundling are
different than the standards courts use in tying cases or in predatory pricing cases, even
though the very same conduct will be at issue in many (though not all) cases.215 In at
least some cases, therefore, whether the conduct is legal or not will depend on whether
the conduct is put into the tying box (per se illegal, at least after market power is shown),
the predatory pricing box (per se legal unless the price charged is below marginal cost),
or the predatory bundling box (in which case the rule of reason is applied).216

2.

Refusals to License IP Rights

A second example involves the treatment of potential liability for intellectual
property owners who unilaterally refuse to license their IP rights to others. In a series of
cases in the late 1990s, the courts of appeals created a varied set of rules for such
“unilateral refusals to license.” These rules vary, from an intent-based focus in the Ninth
215

See also Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Law and Competition for Distribution, 23 Yale J. Reg.
169 (2006) (“Antitrust law has designed rules for each of these practices independently, ignoring
the economic relationships between these business practices.”).
216

The Ninth Circuit has sought to explain the relationship between bundling and predatory pricing,
holding that bundling is not exclusionary unless it results in below-cost prices. See Cascade Health
Solutions v. PeaceHealth, LLC, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. 2007).

For an argument that product bundling under LePage’s must be tested under predatory
pricing standards, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 841;
Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 Emory L.J. 425
(2006). For an argument that it should be treated under the rule of reason, with a quick look
initially applied, see Jonathan M. Lave, The Law and Economics of De Facto Exclusive Dealing,
50 Antitrust Bull. 143, 147 (2005). For an argument for a safe harbor based on market share, see
Wright, supra note __, at 169.
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Circuit to a virtual rule of per se legality for unilateral refusals to license in the Federal
Circuit.217 But in the dispute over the right standard for unilateral refusals to license IP,
these courts have ignored a different legal doctrine that covers precisely the same conduct
– the essential facilities doctrine. That doctrine also governs unilateral refusals to allow a
plaintiff access to a facility, but it has an entirely different set of legal standards. Courts
have generally applied the unilateral refusal to license caselaw to IP and the essential
facilities caselaw to physical standards, but that correspondence is not absolute.218 More
to the point, there is no reason that IP should be subject to a different set of rules than
physical products. There may be reasons the two should lead to different results, for
example because of the need to encourage innovation inherent in the IP system, but there
is no reason to apply completely different legal rules. Once again, the outcome of a case
may depend on nothing more than the choice of which legal rule to apply to the same set
of facts.

3.

Tying

A final example again involves categorizing conduct as involving tying. Tying
arrangements require, among other things, proof that the defendant sold two distinct
products and conditioned the sale of one on the purchase of the other. And because, as
we have seen, tying is treated more harshly than unilateral conduct, antitrust plaintiffs
have an incentive to characterize conduct as involving as tie of two different products
rather than as monopolization. The need for characterization makes sense if the purpose
217

In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Data General
v. Grumman Sys. Support, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak,
125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
218
For a discussion of occasional IP cases litigated under the essential facilities doctrine, see 1
Hovenkamp et al., supra note __, at §13.3c2.
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of the anti-tying rule is to prevent firms with market power in one market from
leveraging it into a separate market. But if the purpose is to prevent one firm from
hurting equally or more efficient competitors, the separate products inquiry seems less
necessary.
The separate products inquiry is subject to manipulation. Is it one product or two
if the monopolist moves to tie before the market has evolved to allow sufficient
independent demand for the tied product? What if there is a demand for the separate
product, but there is also a strong demand for the two together, as with car stereos or
tires? United States v. Microsoft is an obvious example.219 The parties fought for years
over whether Internet Explorer was a separate product from Windows. Interestingly, the
court created a whole new tying rule of reason specific to technological bundles,
reversing the district court’s finding of liability, and then found exactly the same conduct
to constitute section 2 monopolization. The fact that the same conduct gets treated in
different ways under different legal doctrines demonstrates the needless formalism
inherent in the categorization approach.

III. A More Nuanced Approach to Antitrust Analysis
The reader may be forgiven for concluding at this point that we would abolish all
categories in antitrust law. Not so. Categorization can serve an important role in antitrust
analysis. We think, however, that courts must do a better job of considering each form of
categorization and explicitly determining whether the benefits of categorical analysis in
that case outweigh the downsides. In Part II, we itemized the many problems of current
categorical analysis. Part III.A and B balance these problems by evaluating the benefits
219

253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
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of categorical analysis and weighing them against the general costs of categorization.
The remainder of Part III will discuss how courts can secure these benefits of categorical
analysis while avoiding the problems we discussed in Part II.
Our discussion fits within a broader framework of legal scholarship on the choice
between rules and standards. As that literature suggests, the tradeoff is generally one
between certainty and accuracy.220 If neither costs nor uncertainty were a problem,
standards would always be preferable to rules in antitrust cases because they are more
likely to achieve the right result. That is, everything would be subject to an overarching
rule of reason.
An antitrust jurisprudence based on standards is indeed more likely to reach the
right result. But it is also likely to be more costly than a system of simple rules. The
time and cost of full-scale antitrust litigation for every non-frivolous lawsuit would
impose unacceptable costs of litigants and the court system overall as judicial resources
were devoted to high-demand antitrust cases. The problem is worse than that, however. If
parties could not reasonably and accurately predict the outcome of an antitrust case, they
would find it very difficult to make reasonable business decisions. The result might be
overdeterrence – businesses who avoided legitimate conduct because of the fear that it

220

The body of literature on this topic is extensive. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Russell B. Korobkin,
Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23 (2000);
Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 101 (1997);
Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based
Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
Rev. 379 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953 (1995).
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would later be determined to be illegal.221 Or it might be underdeterrence, since plaintiffs
as well as defendants bear court costs.222
Some rules, then, are necessary as a practical matter. The question is how we
select the circumstances in which rules are appropriate. Sometimes rules make sense
because we have enough experience with a particular practice that what we could learn
from reconsidering a particular set of facts is not worth the costs of reopening the debate.
There is no need to repeatedly debate the issue of whether horizontal price-fixing is
necessarily a bad thing, for example. Antitrust defendants have already tried and failed
many times to come up with good reasons to permit cartels; we gain very little by letting
one more defendant have a go at it. In other cases rules are necessary because even if the
court would benefit from a case-specific evaluation, the difficulty or uncertainty of the
evaluation is too great. Antitrust has, for instance, a rule that courts will not consider the
reasonableness of the fixed price.223 In theory, a standard for what constitutes a
reasonable price is conceptually possible, but it would be difficult to implement because
in reality it would be too hard to determine what a “reasonable price” would be.
But the administrative efficiency of rules should not always compel us to forego
the accuracy of standards. The fact that there are classes of behavior that we know
enough to characterize does not mean that categories are always or even usually the best
approach. And as we have seen, many of the categories created in antitrust cases either
make little economic sense or can be gamed so effectively that they do more harm than

221

Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1984).
Easterbrook didn’t spend much time in his 1984 article worrying about this problem, but as
antitrust has become far more defendant-friendly in the intervening two decades, it seems a more
and more salient concern.
222

223

U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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good. Antitrust is out of balance, leaning too heavily in favor of rules rather than
standards. In the sections that follow, we explore these issues in more detail.

A. The Value of Categories
There are several advantages to using categories when analyzing the
reasonableness of trade restraints. First, the proper use of categories facilitates the
efficient use of judicial resources. The primary advantage of the per se rule is that it
“avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries,
in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an
inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.”224 Full-blown rule of reason analysis
draws on judicial and party resources much more than the per se approach.225 When
properly applied, the per se rule allows courts to correctly and efficiently condemn
manifestly unreasonable agreements.226 For example, bid-rigging is per se illegal, as it
should be. Decades of empirical evidence have shown that bid-rigging schemes increase
the price paid (often for government contracts) without any countervailing
procompetitive justification.227 While defendants in bid-rigging cases must be allowed to
224

Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 US. 1,5 (1958).
See HERB HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 105 (2005) (litigating a rule of reason
case is “one of the most costly procedures in antitrust practice”); Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust
“Treble” Damages Really Single Damages? 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 147 n.153 (1993) (“For
example, vertical nonprice cases today probably use more judicial resources on the average than
they did 20 years ago.”).
226
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 n.25 (1984) (“The rationale for per
se rules in part is to avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where
the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is so great as to render unjustified the costs of
determining whether the particular case at bar involves anticompetitive conduct.”) (citing Arizona
v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 350-351 (1982)).
225

227

See, e.g., CHARLES A. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES (1973); JOHN G. FULLER,
THE G ENTLEMAN CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY OF THE PRICE-FIXERS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY (1962).
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contend that they did not in fact rig any bids, it would unnecessarily waste judicial
resources to permit them to dispute argue to a jury that their rigged bids were reasonable
or otherwise justifiable. The per se approach preserves judicial time and resources to
better consider those restraints whose competitive effects are less clear.228
Second, categories can provide the basis for bright-line legal rules, which
facilitate business planning by clearly articulating what types of agreements are
permissible. Properly implemented, per se rules are bright-line rules that provide
certainty.229 While firms may not necessarily favor certain agreements being
categorically condemned, “per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business
community.”230 Businesses know not to fix prices or allocate territory with their
competitors, or to rig bids. With these profit-maximizing methods off the table, firms can
concentrate on legal ways to increase their bottom line.
In addition to categories of restraints that are per se illegal, some conduct is per se
legal. Courts have, for instance, created safe harbors that protect unilateral termination of
dealers231 and allow a monopolist to drive competitors from the market by charging a low
but above-cost price. Designed properly, these bright-line rules are perhaps even more

228

ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 23, THE RULE OF REASON, 3 (1999)
(“Application of the per se approach frees the court from an inquiry into whether the arrangement
at issue has actually harmed consumers or thwarted free market competitive forces.”); ABA RULE
OF REASON MONOGRAPH , supra note xx at 3 (“Indirect cost savings also are achieved by
allowing regulators and the judiciary to focus resources on cases that are not clearly anticompetitive and may present real procompetitive efficiencies.”).
229
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 US. 1,5 (1958) (The “principle of per se
unreasonableness … makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more
certain to the benefit of everyone concerned.”).
230
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n. 16 (1977).
231
Monsanto Corp. v. Spray-Rite Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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valuable because they allow firms to pursue a business strategy openly and aggressively
without fear of legal liability. In sum, categories can enhance predictability.232
Third, in some cases, categories can provide a red flag for judges about whether a
challenged restraint is likely to have anticompetitive consequences. For example,
horizontal restraints are more likely to cause anticompetitive concerns than vertical
restraints. Knowing this helps alert the court to the possibility (or probability) of
anticompetitive effects when an agreement is clearly both horizontal and price-related.
Conversely, the court may be less suspicious of a restraint when it is clearly vertical and
not related to price. There is nothing wrong with judges using these broad truths as a
filter. But this filter only makes sense when the categorization is unambiguous and
uncontroverted. The problem lies in courts investing an inordinate amount of time on
determining the proper category when the purpose of the categorization is to simplify the
inquiry.

B. Currently, the Costs of Categories Outweigh Their Benefits.
The benefits of categorical analysis need to be balanced against the costs.233
Despite the potential benefits of categorical analysis, the process of categorization in
antitrust has unnecessarily imposed significant costs. Further, the manner in which courts
have pursued categorical analysis has often undermined the very benefits that a
categorical approach is intended to achieve.

232

See Cavanagh, supra note xx at 1335 (“[Per se] rules are justified when their benefits, such as
administrative efficiency, ease of application, and predictability, outweigh any negative effects on
antitrust enforcement.”).
233
See, e.g., Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule of Reason,
and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 Antitrust L.J. 435, 458 (2006)
(discussing the tradeoffs between rules and standards in antitrust).
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First, the current reliance on categories – especially when coupled with the per se
rule – risks false positives (i.e., findings of liability when the correct result should be no
antitrust liability). When courts focus on categorization instead of competitive effects, it
increases the probability of mistakes. The Court has acknowledged that in applying the
per se rule “[f]or the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, we have
tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a full-blown inquiry might have
proved to be reasonable.”234 But the Court has justified the risk of false positives by
reasoning that if the categories are drawn appropriately, then instances of false positives
“are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to
identify them.”235 Unfortunately, like most bright-line rules, “[p]er se rules always
contain a degree of arbitrariness”236 and it remains unclear how many false positives are
created by the current categorical approach. Certainly in the decade between Schwinn
and Sylvania, there must have been false positives when non-price vertical restraints were
condemned as per se illegal.
In many instances, it is the obsession with categories that can itself create the
false positive. For example, the facile categorization of the agreement in Topco as
horizontal blinded the Court to the actual competitive effects of agreement among small
and mid-size grocers to create a new brand of products to compete against larger chain

234

Arizona v/ Maricopa county Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); ABA RULE OF REASON
MONOGRAPH, supra note xx at 3-4 (“[o]ccasionally, per se treatment may condemn a practice that
under a specific set of circumstances might have survived rule of reason analysis; these ‘errors’
are tolerated for the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency.”) (citing Arizona v/
Maricopa county Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)).
235
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n. 16 (1977).
236
United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall J., dissenting); see also
Edward D. Cavanagh, Contribution, Claim Reduction, and Individual Treble Damage
Responsibility: Which Path to Reform of Antitrust Remedies?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1277, 1335
(1987) (“Bright-line rules always contain some degree of arbitrariness.”).
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stores. As a result, the Court is widely considered to have reached the wrong result in
Topco.237 In short, in some cases antitrust condemns anticompetitive agreements that
have the potential for increasing consumer welfare or are otherwise efficient.238
In addition to false positives, the current categorical approach probably results in
false negatives as well. The conventional wisdom is that vertical restraints evaluated
under the rule of reason are essentially de facto per se legal since rule of reason cases are
notoriously difficult for plaintiffs to win.239 As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent
questioning use of the rule of reason in Leegin, “One cannot fairly expect judges and
juries in such cases to apply complex economic criteria without making a considerable
number of mistakes, which themselves may impose serious costs.”240 False negatives are
bad because anticompetitive conduct – which reduces consumer welfare – goes
undeterred. The specific conduct at issue in a particular case can continue unfettered and
other firms are encouraged to undertake similar inefficient conduct.241

237

HOVENKAMP (“ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE”), supra note __ at 122 (“If stare decisis had been
applied to a methodology of antitrust analysis, rather than simply to the category of "market
division," the outcome would have been different.”).
238
For example, horizontal price that reduces output in markets characterized by negative
externalities can increase efficiency. See Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through
Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
243 (1993).
239
But see Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F.Supp. 384, (D. Del. 1978) (In “establishing
instead a rule of reason with respect to vertical restraints, Sylvania does not stand for the
proposition that such restraints are per se legal.”)
240
(page 10 of Breyer’s dissent).
241
Dan Crane argues that the prospect of treble damages for antitrust violations means that
antitrust is “powerfully structured to deter violations.” Crane, supra note __, at 89. For a
contrary view, explaining why standing doctrines and other antitrust limits mean that treble
damages often under-deter, see Robert H. Lande, Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be
Raised, 16 Loyola Cons. L. Rev. 329 (2004); Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About Antitrust
Damages, 40 U.S.F. L. Rev. 651 (2006). In our view, Lande has the better of this argument.
While the prospect of treble damages can deter conduct, and therefore avoid false negatives, the
deterrence calculus must take into account the difficulties of proving an antitrust case, and the
low likelihood of success facing antitrust plaintiffs. To take just one example, Hammer and
Sage’s comprehensive study of health care antitrust litigation found that plaintiffs win only 14%
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More generally, categorical approaches produce inaccurate outcomes.
Unfortunately, plaintiffs have a powerful incentive to create false positives, and
defendants have a corresponding incentive to create false negatives. Of course, plaintiffs
want to create true positives and defendants true negatives as well. Often, both sides in
litigation sincerely believe that their position is correct. But litigants are generally more
concerned with winning than the court reaching the “right” result. Given these
incentives, categorical analysis can distract the court from focusing on the actual or likely
economic effects of the challenged restraint, as both plaintiffs and defendants may argue
that effects are irrelevant – plaintiffs because the restraint is horizontal and therefore
unreasonable as a matter of law, and defendants because their conduct was vertical and
thus necessarily harmless. And the fact that many cases don’t fit easily within a
particular box, or that some different categories cover the same conduct, gives lawyers
ample opportunity to game this system. The prospect of strategic behavior by both
antitrust plaintiffs and defendants to fit their case within a favorable box further distorts
outcomes away from efficiency.242
Second, courts often spend more time on the categorization process than they
would on the process of performing proper analysis of the competitive effects of a
challenged restraint. This negates the supposed efficiency advantages of categorization.
of the antitrust cases in the health care industry. Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust,
Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 545, 575 (2002). While health care
cases may be unrepresentative, it is certainly not the case that plaintiffs in any field are winning
antitrust cases in droves in the modern era.
242
For this reason, we think Crane has it backwards when he suggests that standards rather than
rules are more likely to lead to strategic behavior and public choice concerns. Crane, supra note
__, at 97-98. Long experience has shown that it is narrow rules and Congress and administrative
agencies that are more subject to public choice worries than the judiciary. A standard based on
efficiency is particularly hard to manipulate by strategic behavior. As we note below, however,
we do agree with Crane about the importance of some screens to weed out frivolous claims and
defenses without putting the parties to great expense.
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For example, courts invest their energies asking, “Does the conduct fall in the category
‘group boycott’ or not? If so, does it fall in the per se category?” As courts focus on the
horizontal-vertical debate, they miss sight of the true purpose of antitrust law:
condemning restraints that unreasonably reduce consumer welfare. Professor Baker has
astutely observed that “the business certainty and litigation cost reduction benefits of per
se rules are easy to overstate. The fight over characterization -- determining which
pigeonhole -- can involve as much cost, can generate as little business certainty, as a fullblown analysis of reasonableness.”243 Far from generating efficiencies and saving
judicial resources, courts can expend more time attempting to characterize a restraint than
it would take to actually analyze the competitive effects of the challenged agreement.244
And at the end of the day, the information this fight will have produced is far less useful
than would be the results of a direct inquiry into competitive effects.
Third, while categorical reasoning and per se rules are supposed to increase
predictability and consistency, these benefits of categorical analysis have gone largely
unrealized. Shifting categories that leave ill-defined categories in their wakes reduce the
predictability and clarity of antitrust doctrine. While the Court may find the virtue of
flexibility in its admission that there is often no “bright line separating per se from rule of
reason analysis,”245 in the context of a categorical legal framework, the result is mass
confusion. While some restraints are condemned without any analysis of their probable
243

Jonathan Baker, Per Se Rules in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Restraints, 36 ANTITRUST
BULL. 733, 740 n.29 (1991)).
244
HOVENKAMP (“ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE”), supra note __ at 115 (“So conduct must be
characterized before it can be made subject to the per se rule. Furthermore, the characterization
process must be less costly than a full rule of reason analysis. Otherwise the per se rule would be
pointless. If determining that something ought to be governed by the per se rule is just as costly as
applying the rule of reason, then we haven't saved anything.”).
245
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26
(1984)
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effects, in “other cases, [courts] have ignored seemingly intractable antitrust principles in
refusing to apply the per se rule to restraints that likely would have been categorized as
per se offenses in the not-so-distant past. As a result, we are left with no clearly
discernible rule to govern application of the per se rule.”246 On a practical level, this lack
of clarity can make it harder for antitrust plaintiffs to get a good attorney, as lawyers are
reluctant to invest the necessary resources in a case whose course and outcome is so
uncertain.247
Finally, error costs – false positives and false negatives – must be balanced
against administrative benefits. Bright-line rules may be acceptable, despite their error
costs, because they conserve judicial resources. However, the error costs associated with
the categorical approach in antitrust are not offset by administrative savings because, as
we have shown, categorical analysis often requires more effort than an inquiry into the
actual competitive effects of a challenged restraint. In short, the categorical approach
entails both error costs and administrative costs – the worst of both worlds.

All of this suggests that the approach to categorization is not cost-beneficial.
Categorization serves an important role when it simplifies the analysis. However, when
courts spend as much time trying to categorize the conduct as they would determining its
actual competitive consequences, then categorization is a net negative – it produces
246

ABA RULE OF REASON MONOGRAPH, supra note xx at 12.
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 13, TREBLE DAMAGES REMEDY (1986) (“The
necessary economic incentive for a plaintiff and its attorney may not be supplied by a system that
only compensates the plaintiff for its actual damages if it wins, because such a system may not
provide sufficient return to overcome the risks of litigation."‘ Particularly for complex, uncertain
litigation-such as rule of-reason cases-a multiplier may be necessary to induce the necessary
expenditures to develop evidence sufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden of proof.”).
247
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inaccurate outcomes without the cost savings or predictability promised by bright-line
rules. Currently, lawyers and judges spend an inordinate amount of time attempting to
characterize a restraint along a variety of dimensions. For example, in the cases
discussed in Part Two, courts focused a lot of time on determining whether the restraint is
more appropriately categorized as horizontal or vertical. This misses the forest for the
trees. Categorization takes the courts’ time and attention but does not necessarily achieve
better results than a rule of reason analysis. Except in a few special cases, courts should
focus on competitive effects, not on how the restraint is characterized.

C. On the Correct Use of Categories in Antitrust

While the purpose of this Article is to expose the overreliance on and misuse of
categorical analysis in antitrust jurisprudence, it would be improper to criticize the
current use of categories in antitrust without offering suggestions for courts on how to
consider categories when evaluating antitrust claims. However, the goal of this section is
not to advance a new overarching basis for antitrust jurisprudence – that is a separate
article, more ambitious than this effort. Rather, our goal is more modest – to provide an
overview of how courts should approach antitrust issues without over-relying on
categories.

Any use of categorical analysis in antitrust decision-making should be performed
with an eye toward the goals of antitrust law: to detect and deter trade restraints that
unreasonably reduce output, raise price, or diminish competition with respect to quality,
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innovation, or consumer choice. When categorical reasoning does not help the decisionmaker identify and condemn unreasonable trade restraints, such an approach is at best
unnecessary and at worst counterproductive, causing courts to reach incorrect results and
creating confusion within the business community, including those who genuinely want
to operate within the law.

To insure the proper use of categorical analysis, this section argues that courts
should do three things: (1) forego categorizing restraints when the plaintiff proves
anticompetitive effects through direct evidence; (2) properly define the contours of
antitrust categories based on empirical evidence; and (3) constrain the use of categorical
scrutiny when performing rule of reason analysis.

1. When Antitrust Analysis Should Eschew Categories

Categorical analysis is useful when it appropriately simplifies analysis that would
otherwise be overly complex. But categorical analysis is not always necessary or
appropriate. The process of characterizing a challenged restraint along the various
vectors of horizontal versus vertical and price versus nonprice has become the default
starting point in much antitrust analysis. While it may be second nature to categorize,
judicial efficiency can be maximized if other things are considered first.

Categorical analysis is intended to help judges determined whether or not the
challenge conduct is likely to cause anticompetitive effects. But there is no need to
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engage in categorical analysis when plaintiffs present direct evidence of anticompetitive
effects. In addition, the court need not engage in the taxing and often expensive process
of defining the relevant product and geographic market, determining whether or not the
defendants have market power within that market.248

While some courts have indicated that a plaintiff can rely on evidence of direct
economic effects in lieu of defining the relevant market and proving that the defendants
have sufficient market power to unreasonably restrain trade,249 other courts have sought
to limit the role of direct evidence of economic effect, while overemphasizing a
categorical approach.250 The Seventh Circuit has held that direct evidence can substitute
for economic theory only in horizontal, not vertical, restraints.251 This approach is
flawed: direct evidence of anticompetitive effects should be sufficient to establish the
plaintiff's prima facie case regardless of whether or the restraint is categorized as
horizontal or vertical. The Seventh Circuit rule makes the antitrust analysis turn on
irrelevant categorization. If the plaintiff has direct evidence of anticompetitive effects,
then the parties will necessarily engage in a heated debate as to whether the restraint at
issue is horizontal or vertical. The plaintiff must establish that the restraint is horizontal
in order to ensure that its direct evidence will be sufficient to establish the prima facie
case. And, conversely, the defendant will argue that the restraint is vertical and therefore
the presence of direct evidence is not dispositive. This elevates form over substance as
248

The defendant may still be able to argue an efficiency defense, but this currently takes place outside of
categorical contours, as it should.
249
See, e.g., Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460 (circumstantial evidence of market power is
but a “surrogate” for direct evidence of market effects); Toys’r’Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.
2000).
250
See Republic Tobacco Co. v. North Atlantic Trading Co., 381 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2004).
251
Id.
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the parties debate how to categorize a restraint even when the court has direct evidence
on the ultimate question that categorization is intended to help answer: Did the restraint
cause anticompetitive effects? The categorization debate in such cases is at best a red
herring that wastes judicial and party resources on an unnecessary and complicated
inquiry; at worst, the risk of false negatives is magnified as courts ignore direct evidence
in favor of irrelevant disputes about characterization.

We believe that the problems with categorization can be minimized if antitrust
law pays more attention to direct evidence of anticompetitive effects, rather than focusing
on putting conduct into a particular category, and then reasoning from the category into
which it has been put whether or not there are in theory likely to be anticompetitive
effects.252 By championing categorical analysis, the Seventh Circuit approach too
quickly discounts reliable evidence of actual economic effects.253 This is a mistake
because, as we have seen, the categories that are the basis for this economic reasoning are
uncertain, problematic, and subject to manipulation.

2. Categorization Should Have an Empirical Basis

Categories should reflect the wisdom of empirical evidence. This is particularly
important when the categorical label is dispositive, as the per se rule is. The Supreme
Court has asserted that “[i]t is only after considerable experience with certain business

252
253

See Dennis Carlton, Market Definition: Use and Abuse, 3 COMP . POL’Y INT’L 1 (2007).

While some may argue that such evidence might be manipulated, direct evidence is less malleable than
current categorical labels.
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relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act.”254 The
per se rule attempts to convert judicial experience into a labor-saving device: after courts
have seen a particular type of restraint and have condemned it repeatedly under a rule of
reason analysis, that category of restraint warrants per se condemnation because courts
can “predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.”255 In theory, this
also means that the lack of judicial experience with a category of restraints means the
court will apply the rule of reason.256

Despite such paeans to empiricism, federal courts do not always create categories
based on empirical evidence and judicial experience. For example, federal courts have
condemned tying arrangements as nominally per se illegal for decades without any
empirical proof that tying always or almost always unreasonably restrain competition in
the market for the tied product. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Maricopa County
Medical Society condemned maximum price fixing agreements, the majority being
“unpersuaded by the argument that we should not apply the per se rule in this case

254

U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972) (citing Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in
Antitrust Law, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1165 (1964)); see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (quoting Topco).
255
Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); see State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10
(1997) (quoting Maricopa County); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342
(1990) (same); F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) (same).
The abbreviated rule of reason is based on experience as well. See California Dental Ass'n v.
F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (“The object is to see whether the experience of the market has been so
clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction will
follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one.”).
256
See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)
(“experience hardly counsels that we should outlaw the blanket license as a per se restraint of trade.”);
Appalachian Coals v. U.S., 288 U.S. 344, 377 (1933) (“Nothing in theory or experience indicates that the
selection of a common selling agency to represent a number of producers should be deemed to be more
abnormal than the formation of a huge corporation bringing various independent units into one
ownership.”); cf. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85, 1001984) (“we have decided that it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this case. This
decision is not based on a lack of judicial experience with this type of arrangement…”).
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because the judiciary has little antitrust experience in the health care industry.”257 The
Court had not developed empirical evidence about the anticompetitive effects of
maximum price-fixing agreements in general. But that did not stop the court from
putting such agreements in the per se category.

Applying an empirical test, at least some trade restraints clearly belong in the per
se category, most notably bid-rigging, cartel agreements to fix a minimum price, and
agreements to artificially reduce output. Federal courts have over a century’s worth of
empirical evidence that shows that cartels raise price, reducing consumer welfare and
creating inefficiency.258 Similarly, bid-rigging schemes increase the cost of government
contracts, draining the public coffers without any offsetting efficiency gains. These types
of agreements are properly categorized as per se illegal because the empirical evidence
comports with that legal conclusion.

Of course, an empirical approach can also support the creation of categories of
conduct that are per se legal. Nonexclusive patent licenses, for instance, are restraints of
trade, but long experience has taught that they are not unreasonable restraints of trade,
and the grant of a patent license is not itself problematic.259 Similarly, a unilateral

257

457 U.S. at 349.
One problem with the current approach to empiricism is the limited construction of what constitutes
relevant empirical data. The Court has articulated a standard based on judicial experience. The concept of
empiricism should be expanded to include economic case studies performed by qualified academics. Case
studies can represent a fount of in-depth and dependable information. Incorporating non-judicial sources of
reliable empirical data would save courts from having to engage in repeated costly rule of reason analyses
before having sufficient data that a category of restraint warrants per se treatment.
259
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property sec. 3.1 (1995).
258
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decision to set a nonpredatory price is legal per se, because antitrust law has concluded
that even if artificially high prices reduce social welfare in some circumstances, the costs
of judicial scrutiny of the myriad pricing decisions made by dominant firms would far
exceed the benefits. Such conduct is per se legal because we have considerable empirical
data that such agreements and pricing decisions do not reduce output or raise price;
indeed, they tend to have the opposite effect. As with per se illegal conduct, challenged
restraints shold not fall into the per se category until sufficient empirical evidence – in the
form of reliable case studies and/or litigation – demonstrates that the type of restraint
does not unreasonably restrain competition. Theory alone should not move agreements
into the safe harbor of per se legality. Rather, agreements should be categorized
according to their empirically demonstrated procompetitive or anticompetitive effects.

But whether developing rules for per se legality or illegality, antitrust courts
should create categories only when the facts warrant it. If antitrust analysis leads to
consistent results across a range of circumstances – if particular conduct is always
harmful, never harmful, or harmful only in a defined class of cases – then the creation of
an antitrust rule is appropriate. But one of the lessons of Part II is that even then courts
are not done. Factual circumstances can change, and categorizing new conduct merely by
analogizing it to previously categorized conduct is insufficient if the new conduct has
different economic effects. Reasoning by analogy is not empirical analysis and is not
helpful if the debate over how to analogize and categorize overshadows the more
important inquiry into a restraint’s effects on competitive conditions.
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Properly understood, therefore, even bright-line rules require detailed antitrust
analysis into the economic effects of the conduct at issue. It is just that that analysis
occurs in bulk rather than on a case-by-case basis. Further, courts need to be far more
sensitive than they have been to the possibility of gaming the rules they create or making
inefficient changes in behavior in order to fit within an established category.

3. The Clarity of Categories and Antitrust Analysis Beyond the Constraints of
Categories

Most restraints will not fall in a per se category. Particular conduct will have
different one potential anticompetitive effects based on many market characteristics: the
number, market share, product diversification, and financial strength of competitors; the
response of consumers, competitors, and venture capitalists to particular circumstances;
and the structure, regulatory environment, time to market, and barriers to entry in the
particular industry, to name but a few. All these characteristics vary from market to
market.260 Thus, context is important for determining whether or not a particular restraint
is unreasonably anti-competitive. The Supreme Court essentially recognized this in
Sylvania when it declared that “departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based
upon demonstrable economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.”261
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See Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets
and Measuring Market Power, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931225
(working paper 2006) (arguing that antitrust should take into account the empirical economic learning on
how market effects differ by industry).
261
Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).
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If a challenged trade restraint does not appropriately belong in a per se category,
then courts apply rule of reason analysis. Under the rule of reason, the fact finder must
determine whether or not the challenge restraint unreasonably reduces output or injures
price or nonprice competition. It is here -- during the rule of reason discussion -- that
courts sometimes over-rely on categorical analysis as a dangerous crutch.

Proper application of the rule of reason need not – and generally should not –
involve categorical analysis. The most important components of a thorough rule of
reason analysis do not require reliance on categories but on particular evidence about the
nature and effects of a particular restraint in a particular market context. Assuming that
the challenged restraint does not fall within a per se category – and is not so facially
anticompetitive that it warrants condemnation under the quick look – the court should
inquire into the defendants’ market power.262 Firms without market power are unlikely to
reduce output or increase price in a consequential way. Thus, in the absence of any
meaningful market power the court can dispose of the case without additional categorical
analysis being performed doing a rule of reason application.

If the defendants do collectively possess market power, then the court must
determine whether the challenged agreement is likely to produce anticompetitive effects.
Once the court reaches this step in the rule of reason, categories can provide insights but
should not be dispositive. The empirical evidence suggests that a horizontal price
restraint is more likely to have anticompetitive effects than a comparable vertical

262

Of course, if the plaintiff can prove actual anticompetitive effects from the challenge restraint, then
courts can condemn the restraint without elaborate inquiry into market definition and market power.
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nonprice restraint. But this insights applies to restraints that are clearly horizontal and
price-related (such as, price-fixing among competitors) or clearly vertical and not pricerelated (such as a manufacturer’s assignment of territorial responsibilities among its
distributors). If a challenged restraint is not neatly fit with in a recognized category, then
court should not invest significant time and effort trying to pigeonhole the restraint.
Categorical analysis is only appropriate if it accurately and efficiently simplifies the
adjudication process. However, as Part Two illustrated, the process of characterizing
challenged restraint along a variety of categorical boxes often introduces more confusion
than clarity.

The remainder of the rule of reason process need not involve any reference to
antitrust categories. If the plaintiff can establish the defendants' market power and prove
a prima facie case that the restraint is likely to have an anticompetitive effect, the
defendant is given the opportunity to show that the restraint also creates meaningful
efficiencies that could not be realized in the absence of the restraint – in other words, the
efficiencies cannot be realized through a less restrictive alternative. Presented with the
plaintiff's prima facie case of anticompetitive effects and the defendant's colorable claim
of efficiencies, the court should engage in a balancing process to determine whether or
not the likely anticompetitive effects outweigh the probable efficiencies from the
restraint.

Our objective in this Article is not to describe a legal test for how courts should
perform this balancing – or how to define markets, how to assess market power, or how
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to evaluate efficiency claims. Our goal is simply to convince federal judges not to overrely on the comfort of categories when performing rule of reason analysis. Judges should
recognize that none of the steps in a proper rule of reason analysis – market definition,
market power, anticompetitive effects, efficiency arguments, or balancing – requires the
court to employ categorical reasoning.
The thrust of our argument is to explain why categorical analysis in antitrust
jurisprudence is flawed. Our focus in this Article is more on diagnosis and less on
treatment. Eminent scholars like Herb Hovenkamp have proposed frameworks for
evaluating trade restraints under section one. Unfortunately, federal judges are unlikely
to adopt new, more appropriate legal tests absent an appreciation of why their current
approach is inefficient and misguided. This Article attempts to give impetus to
alternative approaches by showing how categorical gives merely the illusion of precision
at considerable (and unnecessary) expense, as measured in accuracy and judicial
resources.

Conclusion
Like the early classifications performed during the Enlightenment, the process of
classifying trade restraints proved to be a valuable tool in early deliberations about how
to determine what conduct should be considered unreasonable and thus violative of
antitrust laws. But, over time, as categories have shifted and become subject to
manipulation, they no longer accurately describe competitive conditions. Blind reliance
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on the categories of yesteryear unnecessarily complicates antitrust litigation, creates
inaccurate results, and creates perverse incentives for American businesses. Antitrust
jurisprudence would benefit significantly from a re-examination of antitrust categories,
including the abandonment of out-moded characterizations and assumptions, coupled
with a greater reliance on empirical evidence to hone more apt rules and better applied
standards.
Only if courts keep the goals of the antitrust inquiry firmly in mind can they avoid
being distracted by the allure of ultimately empty boxes. It’s not important whether the
platypus is a reptile or a mammal; what’s important is that it’s a platypus.
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